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I. INTRODUCTION
One hundred fourteen people died when skywalks over a crowded
hotel lobby collapsed.' A steel fabricator-not the project's structural
engineers-designed the skywalks' fatal connections. Stricter regula-
tion of the design process might have prevented these deaths. Unfor-
tunately, the primary legacy of the 1981 Kansas City Hyatt Regency
Hotel catastrophe is not more aggressive legal controls over specialty
design practices; it is, instead, contracting practices that more aggres-
sively insulate project design professionals from specialty design er-
rors. 2 There is growing evidence that specialty design practices since
1981 portend increasingly troublesome questions of contractual re-
sponsibility and legal liability.
Consider the design arrangements for an upscale office building
damaged by the 1994 Northridge earthquake. The u-shaped building
itself was unharmed, but the framework for the unique central atrium
1. Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Profl Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (recounting one of the most notorious of all construction di-
sasters, which occurred in 1981 when skywalks in the Kansas City Hyatt Re-
gency Hotel lobby collapsed during a Friday afternoon party). The court upheld
revocation of three engineering licenses. Id. at 542. For a more detailed discus-
sion of this case, see infra notes 179-84, 213-19 and the accompanying text.
2. The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel damage claims led to industry form con-
tracts that more effectively protect project design professionals from responsibil-
ity for details provided in shop drawings. See generally 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7:137
(2002); Dale R. Ellickson, Shop Drawings for Construction: Who Really is Re-
sponsible?, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 629-32 (1990); Thomas J. Maloney,
Comment, Flirting with Disaster: The ALA Owner-Architect Agreement Shifts the
Risk of Loss to Owners, 36 Loy. L. REv. 409, 423-24 (1990).
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skylight failed. The building contractor, the manufacturer of the
frame system, the atrium ceiling subcontractor, and an engineering
consultant all participated in the design process, although the re-
ported case does not disclose whether design for the entire building
was centralized under a project architect or engineer.3 Who should be
responsible to the owner for over ten million dollars in lost rent and
repair costs? Does the building contractor's warranty of quality work
extend to the skylight's design furnished by a supplier who manufac-
tured the framework for the subcontractor? Should tort law in such a
case trump private contracts by imposing an expanded duty on all
those involved with the specialty design? If so, should courts curb the
economic loss rule to allow recovery of pecuniary loss caused by a spe-
cialty design firm to another participant in the construction process
who had no contract with the specialty designer?
These notable cases dramatize the prominent role of shared, dele-
gated, and specialty design practices in the history of construction in-
dustry calamities. They also serve as reminders that the risk of
devastating personal injury, extreme property damage, and cata-
strophic economic loss permeates the building design and construction
process. 4
Over the last fifty years, advances in construction techniques, to-
gether with increasing project complexity, have caused project design
to become more technically demanding and specialized-a fact grotes-
quely underscored by the threat of terrorist attacks that now place
previously unimaginable demands on building security and safety.5
At the same time, developments in professional liability law and the
dramatic growth in damage claims throughout the construction indus-
try have radically increased the liability risk for those who participate
3. See Filmland Dev., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., Nos. B136497, B140556, 2002 WL
31693595 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2002). The court, presented primarily with evi-
dentiary issues, affirmed a judgment in favor of the contractor, the subcontractor,
and the engineer. Other defendants settled.
4. See generally John J. McNamara, Compensatory Damages, in 2 CONSTRUCTION
LAW HANDBOOK 1117 (Robert F. Cushman & James J. Myers eds., 1999); Justin
Sweet, Owner-Architect-Contractor: Another Eternal Triangle, 47 CAL. L. REV.
645 (1959).
5. Without suggesting the existence of a design defect, one engineer has asked
whether a more integrative approach to structural design could have saved lives
by delaying (but not preventing) the collapse of the two towers of the World Trade
Center when terrorists slammed commercial airliners into them on September
11, 2001. See Thomas W. Eager & Christopher Musso, Why did the World Trade
Center Collapse? Science, Engineering and Speculation, J. MINS., METALS, &
MATERIALS Soc'y, Dec. 2001, at 8. Even in more innocent times, however, con-
struction professionals and construction lawyers have noted the impact of in-
creased project complexity. See generally The American Bar Association Forum
on the Construction Industry, Getting it Right: How to Structure Complex
Projects to Allocate Risks and Minimize Disputes (2001) (collection of seminar pa-
pers discussing allocation of risks in complex industrial projects).
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in design activities.6 All of these factors have led to a subtle shift in
the responsibility of design professionals. Project design is increas-
ingly a collaborative process involving several design professionals
and trade specialists.7 While this trend reflects the realities of mod-
ern design and construction, it also blurs the traditional lines of pro-
fessional responsibility and legal liability for design.
One might expect design specialization to create clear and exclu-
sive lines of design responsibility for distinct specialty components of a
construction project. Industry perspectives seem to hope for this re-
sult.8 More often than not, however, these shared design practices
confound the liability analysis by sprinkling duties relating to spe-
cialty design among several participants having independent contrac-
tual relationships with different members of the project design and
construction team.
The scholarly literature and trade publications have focused on the
now popular design-build contracting practice, which places all de-
sign and construction responsibility on a single party.9 Modern
shared design practices, however, mark an entirely distinct develop-
ment-the emergence of a new design-build world in which design re-
sponsibility is diffused rather than centralized.
This Article examines the development, current legal status, and
long-range legal implications of shared design. Of special interest is
the practice of assigning significant responsibility for specialty design
to those who have no direct contractual relationship with the owner of
the project or the owner's primary design professional. This Article
6. See JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 325-27 (6th ed. 2000) (demonstrating that the major fac-
tors contributing to the increased risk of professional liability for architects and
engineers have been at work for many years and parallel the development of tort
law in general); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law: Real-
ity and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463, 476; see also
Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARv. L. REV.
1075, 1075-83 (1979).
7. See generally 5 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 2, § 17:70.
8. See Mark C. Friedlander, Design-Build and MIE Systems: Some Legal Concerns,
CONSULTING-SPECIFYING ENGINEER, June 2001, at 13 [hereinafter Friedlander,
Legal Concerns]; Mark C. Friedlander, Shop Drawing "Approval" Liability, CON-
SULTING-SPECIFYING ENGINEER, Nov. 2000, at 21 [hereinafter Friedlander, Liabil-
ity]; James E. Rowings Jr. et al., Design/Build Methods for Electrical Contracting
Industry, J. CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING & MGMT., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 15.
9. The design-build system has gained a steady share of the construction market in
the United States over that past thirty years. See generally DESIGN-BUILD CON-
TRACTING HANDBOOK (Robert F. Cushman & Kathy Sperling Taub eds., 1992); Hal
G. Block, As the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Architects' Expanded Liability
Under Design-Build/Construction Contracting, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1984);
John W. Hinchey, Karl Marx and Design-Build, 21 CONSTRUCTION LAW, Winter
2001, at 46; Kenneth M. Roberts & Nancy C. Smith, Design-Build Contracts
under State and Local Procurement Laws, 25 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 645 (1996).
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refers to that form of shared design as "specialty design-build" be-
cause it uses specialty designers, trade contractors, and specialty sub-
contractors both to furnish the design and to build, fabricate, or install
specialized components of a project for which the owner's project ar-
chitect or engineer ("project A/E")lO furnishes the broad design
concepts.
The widespread introduction of specialty design-build requires a
new perspective on risk allocation. This new perspective must allow
emerging industry practices for specialty design to achieve the legiti-
mate expectations of the participants economically and rationally
while at the same time recognizing important considerations of public
policy, building safety, and the integrity of the regulated design
professions.
Part II of this Article examines how specialty design-build fits into
the context of established design and construction contract structures.
Part III explores the contract and tort theories that govern the liabil-
ity of project participants for design errors and defects and that will
guide courts, arbitrators, and construction lawyers who face the
shared design conundrum. Part IV reviews why and how the con-
struction industry relies increasingly on shared design practices, par-
ticularly specialty design-build, and it challenges the current
industry, legislative, and regulatory perspectives on specialty de-
sign-build. Part V identifies and offers proposals concerning the fun-
damental policy considerations that should inform legislatures,
regulatory agencies, courts, mediators, arbitrators, and construction
lawyers as they face the unique responsibility and risk allocation is-
sues of this new design-build world.
Specialty design-build involves only one of several established con-
tracting structures used in the construction industry. A brief review
of the common industry methods for allocating design responsibility
will help place the discussion in the proper context.
10. This Article adopts shorthand conventions to identify the roles of project partici-
pants. "Project A/E" is an architect or engineer retained by the owner to furnish
the overall project design. "Owner" holds legal title during construction and re-
tains the primary building contractor, here called the "prime contractor." Indus-
try literature often describes the latter role as the "general contractor" or simply
'contractor." See Alan B. Stover, Construction and Design Contracts, in CON-
STRUCTION LAW § 3.01[21[d] (Steven G. M. Stein ed. 2002) [hereinafter STEIN,
CONSTRUCTION LAW]; JUSTIN SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION LAW 10-11 (1997).
"Subcontractor" refers to any participant who has a contract, directly or indi-
rectly derived from the prime contract, to perform work or services or to provide
materials or equipment. Thus, specialty building contractors, sub-subcontrac-
tors, suppliers, manufacturers, fabricators, and specialty designers all may be
subcontractors under this definition if the owner-prime contractor agreement en-
compasses their work or services. The terms "specialty trade" and "specialty
firm" refer to those (often subcontractors) responsible for discrete components of
a project.
2005]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
II. ALLOCATING DESIGN RESPONSIBILITY-THE
ESTABLISHED CONTRACT PATTERNS
The construction industry has developed several alternative con-
tractual models for allocating responsibility and risk among the par-
ticipants to the construction process.' 1 These pattern contractual
arrangements, or project delivery systems,12 consist of a related series
of bilateral contractual relationships that allocate some duties and
risks to the owner, others to design professionals, and still others to
building contractors and specialty trades. A project delivery system is
"an effort to shape a relationship so as to solve a problem."13 The
owner must select a contractual structure based on interdependent
factors, the most critical of which are function, aesthetics, quality,
cost, and schedule. 14 Only feasibility and imagination limit the possi-
ble variations in project delivery systems. Each system defines roles
for the participants to the design and construction process in different
ways to achieve different objectives. For example, an owner may pre-
fer one system for budgetary reasons; another owner may select a dif-
ferent system because it will save time or increase owner input and
control. 15
A. Design-Bid-Build
Currently in the United States, the most common project delivery
system involves two sequential contractual arrangements. 16 The first
arrangement is between the owner and the project architect or engi-
neer, the second is between the owner and the prime contractor.
Within the construction industry, this structure is sometimes referred
to as "design-bid-build" because it involves three distinct phases.17
In the design phase, the project A/E prepares comprehensive plans
and specifications sufficiently definitive to permit lump-sum price es-
timates. In the bid phase, the owner submits the plans and specifica-
11. See Stover, supra note 10, § 3.01; Stanley P. Sklar, Selecting the Correct Delivery
System and Negotiating the Right Construction Contract, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, §§ 11.01-.05; SWEET, supra note 10, at 84-99.
12. Professor Sweet also calls these alternative contractual arrangements "organiza-
tional variations." SWEET, supra note 10, at 84.
13. Robert L. Meyers, III & Michael F. Albers, Build-Own-Transfer: Continued Need
for Coordinated Documents, 391 PLIREAL 7, 9 (1993).
14. Stover, supra note 10, § 3.01[1] [a].
15. At least if one adopts an economic analysis, the construction and design industry
should view all feasible systems as neutral alternatives. Pricing for design and
construction services should respond to market conditions and should reflect the
costs, including risk, involved. While a given design or construction firm may not
be in a position to function efficiently in all project delivery systems, the industry
as a whole should be able to respond to owner demands.
16. See Stover, supra note 10, § 3.01[2]; SWEET, supra note 10, at 84.
17. Hinchey, supra note 9, at 46.
168 [Vol. 84:162
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tions to one or more prime contractors who either submit bids as part
of a competitive award process or who submit proposals to the owner
for negotiation.1 8 In the build phase, the prime contractor to whom
the owner has awarded the job builds the project strictly in accordance
with the plans and specifications.
Often, the project AlE continues to provide services to the owner
throughout the construction period.19 These services may include in-
specting construction progress, reviewing contractor submittals that
illustrate proposed execution of the design, processing change orders,
approving contractor payment applications, resolving owner-contrac-
tor disputes, and interpreting design documents. 20 As a result, the
responsibilities covered by the owner-design professional agreement
and the owner-prime contractor agreement overlap as to time and
activities.
The design-bid-build system began to gain dominance in the
United States early in the twentieth century as architecture and engi-
neering emerged as professions distinct from the craft trades.2 1 This
system fosters a strong design professional-client relationship. Most
owners need professional help to manage the relationship with the
prime contractor. Even in the most congenial and trusting circum-
stances, an owner and the owner's building contractor have signifi-
cantly conflicting interests. The owner expects the contractor to
deliver a project that meets functional and qualitative expectations
and that is completed on time and within budget. Both parties know
that the relationship will become adversarial if these expectations are
not met. By establishing a professional relationship with the project
A/E, the owner obtains not only technical design services but also ad-
vice and guidance from an independent specialist.
The design-bid-build process has other advantages as well. Its
linear approach establishes a detailed project design that should pro-
vide an adequate basis for establishing a reliable budget and comple-
tion schedule before the owner engages a builder. It may also promote
the quality of the work by allowing the professional who designed the
project to render opinions that require an interpretation of construc-
tion documents.
One legal consequence of the design-bid-build project delivery sys-
tem has overriding importance for design liability analysis. When the
18. Professor Sweet also refers to this project delivery system as "de-
sign-award-build" because a private owner using this system is at least as likely
to award the construction contract to a prime contractor through a negotiated
selection process as through a competitively bid process. SWEET, supra note 10, at
84.
19. Id. at 114-15.
20. For a more detailed description of services that a project architect often provides
during the construction period, see id.
21. Stover, supra note 10, § 3.01[211[a].
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owner elects the design-bid-build system, the owner and its project
A/E-not the prime contractor and its subcontractors-bear the risk
of design errors and defects.22 Under federal contract law, this princi-
ple has developed as the Spearin doctrine, named after United States
v. Spearin,2 3 in which the Supreme Court held that "if the contractor
is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the
owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of
defects in the plans and specifications." 24 The Spearin doctrine is
widely recognized by state courts as well as the federal courts. 2 5
This Article considers shared design practices primarily by exam-
ining specialty design-build as an emerging variation on the tradi-
tional design-bid-build system. While many of the issues discussed
here are equally important whenever design responsibility is shared
among multiple design participants, considering specialty de-
sign-build in the context of the design-bid-build project delivery sys-
tem places the principle issues in sharp relief. A brief review of some
alternative project delivery systems will help clarify why this is so.
B. Alternative Project Delivery Systems
The primary alternative to the traditional approach is the de-
sign-build project delivery system, which involves a single contract for
both design and construction services rather than one contract for de-
sign and another for construction. The industry calls this system de-
sign-build because it combines into a single role the design
responsibility of the project A/E and the building function of the prime
contractor. The design-builder resembles the master builder, who, in
a simpler time, provided project oversight for the owner from the pre-
liminary design phase through final completion.26 Throughout Eu-
rope and elsewhere outside of the United States, design-build has
become entrenched as a prominent system. 27 Over the past thirty
years, the design-build process has steadily gained favor in the
United States as well.28
In contrast to the design-bid-build system, in a design-build pro-
ject the owner does not assume the risks of design errors and defects
22. See Bruce W. Ficken, Construction Failures, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, § 29.02[B][11.
23. 248 U.S. 132 (1918).
24. Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
25. See Ficken, supra note 22, § 29.02[B][1].
26. See Block, supra note 9, at 2.
27. See Kevin B. Lynch, Design-Build Contracts in Virginia, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 791,
798 (1980).
28. See Michael C. Loulakis, Single Point Responsibility in Design-Build Con-
tracting, in DESIGN-BuILD CONTRACTING HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 1-3.
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because the owner does not furnish the plans and specifications. 29
The owner may still be responsible, however, for preliminary design
criteria or other design documentation or data the owner or its repre-
sentatives furnish to the prime contractor. 30
The chief advantages of the design-build system are that it estab-
lishes a single point of responsibility for all aspects of the project and
that it may save time and expense by combining design and execution
functions.3 1 Design-build construction is especially attractive for
projects that are not sensitive to aesthetic issues and ones in which
engineering concerns dominate over architectural ones, such as indus-
trial plants.32 When the parties define successful project completion
by reference to performance specifications or other objective criteria,
the design-build firm is free to make design decisions that facilitate
the completion of the project on time and within budget without inter-
ference from the owner or an independent design professional repre-
senting the owner's interests. 33  Because design-build leaves
important project details to the builder, who must balance quality,
cost, and schedule concerns, it may lead to material disputes about
results or quality after construction is complete. 3 4
Construction projects may also employ a number of variations on
the design-bid-build and design-build systems, or they may adopt
other established contracting structures. For instance, an owner may
provide complete design plans and specifications for some aspects of
the project while establishing only performance specifications for
other facets of the project. 3 5 Another alternative is for the owner to
coordinate and manage multiple, direct contracts for distinct aspects
of the project. 3 6 In another system, construction management, the
owner retains a representative to coordinate and manage a series of
contracts. 37 In the project and program management systems the
owner retains a consultant to coordinate design as well as construc-
tion activities and even other aspects of the overall development of the
29. Aleutian Constructors v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 372, 378 (1991); see Jeffrey S.
Roehl & Jesse B. Grove III, Performance Guarantees and Testing; Intellectual
Property and Technology Transfer Issues, in DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTING HAND-
BOOK, supra note 9, § 13.4.
30. Aleutian Constructors, 24 Cl. Ct. 372.
31. See Loulakis, supra note 28, at 1, 3, 5-6.
32. See Lynch, supra note 27, at 378.
33. Sklar, supra note 11, § 11.01[J].
34. See Loulakis, supra note 28, at 14.
35. See Ficken, supra note 22, § 29.02[B][1].
36. See Stover, supra note 10, § 3.01[31 [c]. This approach, which is common in simple
projects or for owners who are experienced project managers, eliminates the fee
that general contractors charge for project supervision.
37. See Richard D. Conner, Contracting for Construction Management Services, 46
LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1983).
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project.38 The turnkey system leaves the entire responsibility and
risk for the project with a developer, who owns the project until it has
been completed to the owner's satisfaction. 39 In a more extreme ver-
sion of the turnkey system, the developer also operates the project for
a time after completion for the benefit of the ultimate user. 40 Phased
or fast-track construction is yet another process, although it is not so
much an arrangement to allocate responsibilities as it is a schedule
management technique to allow construction on some aspects of the
project to begin while design continues on others.41
In a broad sense, this Article addresses liability issues that may
arise under any project delivery system when multiple participants
share responsibility for related design activities. In a narrower sense,
the focus here is on these issues when they arise in a design-bid-build
project-that is, when both the owner's project A/E and one or more
subcontractors (or in some cases the prime contractor) share related
design responsibilities. The design-bid-build delivery system pro-
vides a more compelling platform for analyzing the issues than do the
alternative systems because only the design-bid-build system neces-
sarily requires that a design professional serving as the owner's repre-
sentative must maintain some degree of responsibility for project-wide
design.
C. Analyzing Design Liability in a Shared Design Context
Specialty design-build in a design-bid-build project does not
merely involve the adaptation of design-build concepts to the tradi-
tional construction process. An essential characteristic of the de-
sign-bid-build system is the division of design and construction
responsibility. Conversely, an essential character of design-build is
single point responsibility for both design and construction. The intro-
duction of specialty design-build into a design-bid-build project turns
each of these characteristics on its head by spreading responsibility
for design among multiple participants. Specialty design-build dif-
fuses responsibility for design and increases the potential for design
errors attributable to the acts and omissions of multiple actors. As a
result, when the participants employ the practice in a de-
sign-bid-build project, they strain the boundaries of the contract and
tort principles that govern liability for design errors and defects.
38. See Stover, supra note 10, § 3.0114][b].
39. See id. § 3.01[4] [d].
40. Meyers & Albers, supra note 13, at 7. Several variations on the
build-own-transfer structure allocate risks in different ways, but all involve a
developer who takes some risk or responsibilities retained by the owner in a
traditional project. Id. at 23-26.
41. See Stover, supra note 10, § 3.01[3][e].
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III. THEORIES OF DESIGN LIABILITY
The course of design liability theories straddles the boundary be-
tween contract and tort. Some authorities reflect the character of de-
sign and construction activities as essentially commercial endeavors,
thereby promoting the dominance of contract law. 4 2 However, a
greater number of authorities emphasize the potential risks of harm
presented by design and construction activities and, as a result, pro-
mote the expansion of tort principles to protect victims who suffer
foreseeable harm.4 3
The developing practice of specialty design-build presents a com-
pelling invitation to revisit design liability principles. In some impor-
tant areas, especially concerning remedies available to those not party
to any contract for design services, that invitation requires further ex-
ploration of the policies that underlie the distinction between contract
and tort remedies. This Part reviews established and developing theo-
ries of design liability that must inform an analysis of the new de-
sign-build world. Part V of this Article then draws on these theories
to argue for a new perspective on design responsibility for projects us-
ing specialty design-build and other forms of shared design processes.
A. Design Liability Based in Contract
Clients normally retain design professionals pursuant to written
agreements of varying levels of completeness and sophistication. It is
this contract between client and design professional that establishes
one important basis for analyzing the legal relationship. The use of
detailed written contracts, while customary for design services, stands
in significant contrast to the customs for legal, medical, and many
other professional services. Even so, contract principles prove less sig-
nificant than tort principles in the development of design liability law.
In part, this is because relatively few design contracts prescribe stan-
dards of professional responsibility,44 and some that do merely adopt
a standard equivalent to the tort standard of care.4 5 For this reason,
many claims brought against design professionals by their clients turn
on a tort rather than a contract analysis. This section begins with a
review of the applicable contract principles, an exercise that will
quickly redirect attention to tort principles.
42. SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.11(C).
43. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 996-97 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Rous-
seau v. K.N. Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 192-93 (R.I. 1999).
44. Although the primary industry form documents traditionally did not specify a
standard, and the forms promulgated by the American Institute of Architects still
do not, some industry forms specifically articulate the professional standard of
care. SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.07.
45. See id. § 17.04(C).
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1. Defective Design Constituting Breach of Contract
An early Pennsylvania case, Follansbee Brothers Co. v. Garrett-
Cromwell Engineering Co. ,46 provides an unusually direct illustration
of how a defective design can breach an express contract term. The
defendant engineering company agreed with the plaintiff to "furnish
all necessary working drawings for a pair of 25 ton basic open hearth
furnaces similar to those we constructed for the C. Pardee Works at
Perth Amboy, N.J."47 At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence to
show that the drawings were not similar to those used to build the
New Jersey furnaces. The trial court, applying a tort standard, held
that the plaintiff had the burden to establish that the defendant's
plans "were not in accordance with ordinary engineering skill as of the
date when they were made."48 On appeal, the court reversed the judg-
ment in favor of the defendant and held that the plaintiff could estab-
lish a viable contract claim "if the plaintiff could show that the design
according to which it built was dissimilar from the New Jersey fur-
naces in important respects and that because of this dissimilarity the
plaintiffs furnaces could not be made to work successfully."4 9 The
contract theory of the Follansbee case is unremarkable: the engineer
was liable for damages caused by a breach of the contract terms. The
case is unusual, however, because relatively few design defect cases
arise out of a breach of an express term of the design contract.
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co.50 provides an-
other striking instance of faulty performance of design services as a
potential breach of contract. There, a contract required the engineer
to perform its services "in accordance with the highest standards of
the engineering profession."5 1 While this contract provision suggests
the novel instance of an express contract duty of professional care go-
ing well beyond the tort standard, the case did not present an opportu-
nity for the court to construe the provision.5 2 Although there may be
instances in which the parties to a design contract adopt a standard
for performance of professional design services that is either higher or
46. 48 Pa. Super. 183 (1911).
47. Id. at 186.
48. Id. at 190.
49. Id.
50. 355 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
51. Id. at 379.
52. The case involved only the prime contractor's claim against the project engineer
and the owner, while the contract imposing the "highest standard" was between
the owner and the project engineer. The court rejected the prime contractor's
arguments for third-party beneficiary status. Id. at 392.
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lower than the professional standard of care imposed under tort law,
relatively few reported cases consider such contract provisions.53
Breach of express contractual obligation is the most direct theory
that may govern design liability, but it is not the most common one
disclosed by the reported cases. The courts more often rely on theories
that start with the contract between design professional and client but
then move beyond the express contract terms.
2. Implied Contractual Obligations
Courts have often declined to imply into a design contract a war-
ranty that the design will be free from defects or will achieve a specific
result.54 The primary basis for this is that design professionals can-
not guarantee results. 55 A design professional "is not liable for fault
in construction resulting from defects in the plans because he does not
imply or guarantee a perfect plan or a satisfactory result."56
By contrast, courts may imply into a design-build contract a war-
ranty that the design-build contractor will furnish a design fit for the
intended purpose.5 7 Prier v. Refrigeration Engineering Co.58 involved
construction of an ice rink. The defendant provided the specifications
for the refrigeration system and for the base upon which the ice sheet
would rest. The court held that the plaintiff could proceed on an im-
plied warranty theory. "Where a person holds himself out as qualified
to furnish, and does furnish, specifications and plans for a construc-
tion project, he thereby impliedly warrants their sufficiency for the
purpose in view."5 9 Although the holding seems to expand liability for
design activities generally, one could argue that it is limited to design
furnished under a design-build contract.60
A 1966 Minnesota case recognized an implied warranty of fitness
in a design-build contract:
53. See generally SWEET, supra note 6, § 17.04; Kenneth I. Levin, Duties and Liabili-
ties of the Architect-Engineer to the Owner, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK,
supra note 4, § 4.01[A].
54. See, e.g., City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 423-25 (Minn. 1978)
(rejecting the owner's argument for rule implying into all contracts for architec-
tural services a warranty that a structure built in accordance with the architect's
plans will be fit for its intended purpose); White v. Pallay, 247 P. 316, 319 (Or.
1926) (regarding a defective foundation; no evidence that the architect gave any
warranty as to results); Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (Va.
1953) (finding no implied warranty where architect designed sliding roof that
performed poorly).
55. White, 247 P. at 317.
56. Surf Realty Corp., 78 S.E.2d at 907.
57. See generally SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.07.
58. 442 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1968).
59. Id. at 624.
60. See Note, supra note 6, at 1093-94.
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[Ulnder circumstances where (1) the contractor holds himself out, expressly or
by implication, as competent to undertake the contract; and the owner (2) has
no particular expertise in the kind of work contemplated; (3) furnishes no
plans, design, specifications, details, or blueprints; and (4) tacitly or specifi-
cally indicates his reliance on the experience and skill of the contractor, after
making known to him the specific purposes for which the building is
intended.6 1
The case involved a design-build contract for construction of a
grain elevator by a lumber company. The opinion affirmed the judg-
ment for the owner based on the trial court's finding that the owner
had relied on the lumber company for all design details, including the
structural details.6 2 Subsequently, the Minnesota Supreme Court
characterized the case as one governing construction contracts rather
than contracts for design services. 63
If the design contract requires the design professional to furnish
cost estimates for the project to the owner, some courts have implied a
warranty that the estimates will be reasonably accurate. 6 4 For exam-
ple, in another Minnesota case the court held that the owner could
recover for breach of implied warranty without introducing any expert
testimony to show negligence where the evidence established "a gross
underestimation of costs." 65
Other than the implied warranty cases, the design liability cases
that rely on contract principles provide little grist for the analytic mill.
Indeed, some of the most interesting opinions that imply obligations
into a contract for design services do so by crossing into the intersec-
tion of contract and tort principles. Take, for example, an opinion out
of Virginia:
An architect, in the preparation of plans and drawings, owes to his employer
the duty to exercise his skill and ability, his judgment and taste reasonably
and without neglect. In his contract of employment he implies that he pos-
sesses the necessary competency and ability, to enable him to furnish plans
and specifications prepared with a reasonable degree of technical skill.
6 6
In recognizing an implied warranty of fitness in the sale of a new resi-
dence, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted the language of the court
of appeals, which drew extensively from product liability analysis. 6 7
A recent West Virginia case68 took the analysis a step further by im-
plying a design warranty into a non-contractual relationship. There
the court held that the owner's project A/E impliedly warranted to the
61. Robertson Lumber Co. v. Stephen Farmers Co-op. Elevator Co., 143 N.W.2d 622,
626 (Minn. 1966).
62. Id.
63. City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978).
64. See e.g., Kostohryz v. McGuire, 212 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1973); Durand Assoc. v.
Guardian Inv. Co., 186 Neb. 349, 183 N.W.2d 246 (1971).
65. Kostohryz, 212 N.W.2d at 854.
66. Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (Va. 1953) (citations omitted).
67. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 798-99 (Mo. 1972) (en banc).
68. E. Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266 (W.Va. 2001).
[Vol. 84:162
SPECIALTY DESIGNS
prime contractor that the plans and specifications were prepared with
the ordinary skill, care, and diligence required of the profession. Ap-
plying tort principles, the court reasoned that a special relationship
existed between the design professional and the contractor that im-
posed on the design professional a duty of care in favor of the contrac-
tor. In this manner, the courts today can make the transition from
contract to tort principles-a transition that is central to the develop-
ment of design liability law and its application to specialty design.
B. Duty and the Implied Warranty of Reasonable Care-The
Transition to Tort Theory
Tort theory, rather than contract theory, dominates in design lia-
bility cases. 6 9 However, as a general rule, a breach of contract is not a
proper basis for a tort claim. 70 On what basis, then, is a design profes-
sional who provides services pursuant to a contract subject to tort lia-
bility in the first place?
Consider a contract for design services that describes the services
the design professional will provide, but establishes no standard for
the quality of the services and expressly disclaims any warranty that
the services will achieve any specific result. 7 1 If the design profes-
sional provides the services required by the contract, on what basis
can errors or deficiencies in the design justify tort remedies?
The answer stems from the special relationship tort law recognizes
between design professional and client. "In most instances, a negli-
gence action will not lie when the parties are in privity of contract.
When, however, there is a special relationship between the alleged
tortfeasor and the injured party not arising in contract, the breach of
that duty of care will support a tort action."72 A remedy in tort is
available only if a legal duty apart from the contractual obligation it-
self exists. Although the reference to a relationship "not arising in
contract" seems to exclude the design professional-client relationship
created by contract, it does not. While courts sometimes refer to the
separate duty imposed under tort law as one that is "independent"
from the contract,73 the separate legal duty may be dependent on the
contract in the sense that the duty that gives rise to tort liability may
arise out of the contractual relationship. "This legal duty must spring
69. See generally Levin, supra note 53, §§ 4.01-03.
70. Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R., 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (N.Y. 1987).
71. One of the most popular industry form contracts for architectural services is such
a contract. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B141TM-1997,
STANDARD FORM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN OWNER AND ARCHITECT WITH STANDARD
FORM OF ARCHITECT'S SERVICES (1997) [hereinafter AIA ARCHITECT'S SERVICES].
72. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463
S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) (citations omitted).
73. Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc., 516 N.E.2d at 193.
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from circumstances extraneous to, and not constituting elements of,
the contract, although it can be connected with and dependent upon
the contract." 74
A Minnesota court explained the transition from contract to tort
theory in a case where a client sued a design professional for damages
resulting from professional errors and omissions. 7 5
Under Minnesota law, "one who undertakes to render professional services is
under a duty to the person for whom the service is to be performed to exercise
such care, skill, and diligence as men in that profession ordinarily exercise
under the circumstances." . . . Forest [client] can maintain a claim for negli-
gent design of the sawmill against Ligna [engineer] because Ligna owed a
duty to perform its design services using the care, skill, and diligence that
sawmill designers ordinarily exercise.
7 6
Liability under tort law arises out of a judicial policy decision to im-
pose a duty on the design professional to conform his or her conduct to
a judicially defined standard of care. While this transition to tort the-
ory is analytically significant, it does not render the contract irrele-
vant. Because the design professional's tort duty of care arises out of
the special relationship established by the contract for professional
services, contract interpretation often provides the framework for de-
fining the duty underlying the tort theory. Design contracts may es-
tablish many different roles for design professionals, ranging from
plenary control over the project to specialized activities such as esti-
mating costs, inspecting work in progress, and approving contractor
payments. Each role defines its own scope for professional malprac-
tice. 77 Absent special public policy considerations, the express terms
of the contract should control if the contract expressly establishes or
disclaims a duty. Thus, courts refer to the terms of the contract to
determine the nature and extent of the duty recognized for purposes of
tort law. An important consequence is that the design professional is
under a duty of professional care in connection with every professional
service, function or activity that the contract covers.78
A corollary to the principle that a design professional must perform
contractual design services in accordance with the professional stan-
dard of care is that the design professional's duty of care is normally
coextensive with the scope of the contractual duty. In Moundsview
Independent School District v. Buetow & Associates, Inc.,79 the con-
74. Id. at 194.
75. Minn. Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D. Minn.
1998).
76. Id. at 915 (quoting City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. 1974).
77. See Levin, supra note 53, § 4.03[C] (discussing malpractice cases involving sev-
eral distinct design roles).
78. Presumably, breach of a non-professional obligation, such as the obligation the
project A/E might undertake to pay consultants, would not give rise to a tort
duty.
79. 253 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1977).
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tract between the owner and the architect included a provision for the
architect to make periodic visits to the project site, but only for limited
purposes. The contract also provided: "The Architect shall not be re-
sponsible for the acts or omissions of the Contractor, or any Subcon-
tractors, or any of the Contractor's or Subcontractors' agents or
employees, or any other persons performing any of the Work."80 The
court held that this disclaimer was controlling when considered to-
gether with the contract terms that provided for "general supervision"
services rather than a "full-time project representative."S1
The Moundsview court correctly recognized the importance of giv-
ing effect to the parties' economic bargain. Fee negotiations for profes-
sional services inevitably reflect the nature and extent of the services
included. While the law should impose on the design professional a
duty of care concerning each service upon which the fee is based, the
courts will generally not impose on the design professional a duty of
care with respect to functions and activities not encompassed by the
contract.
Brown v. Gamble Construction Co.8 2 also addressed an architect's
contractual duty to supervise. The action arose out of an accident in
which a roofer fell through a hole in a roof under construction. The
contracts included provisions that made the prime contractor respon-
sible for safety, as well as a provision that recognized that the archi-
tect was not responsible for "construction means, methods,
techniques, sequences of procedures, or for safety precautions and pro-
grams in connection with the Work."83 The court held that an archi-
tect has no duty to assure job safety absent an express agreement.8 4
C. Design Liability Based in Tort
1. Elements of a Design Malpractice Claim
A plaintiff bringing a professional malpractice claim must satisfy
the familiar elements of a tort claim: the existence of a duty of care
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; breach of that duty by the de-
fendant; and recoverable damages proximately caused by the breach
of duty.8 5 The professional standard of care for design professionals is
similar to the standards applied to other professionals in their rela-
tionships to their clients or patients. "[Tihe responsibility of an archi-
tect does not differ from that of a lawyer or physician. When he
possesses the requisite skill and knowledge, and in the exercise
80. Id. at 838.
81. Id. at 839.
82. 537 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
83. Id. at 687.
84. Id.
85. See Constance Frisby Fain, Architect and Engineer Liability, 35 WASHBURN L.J.
32, 34 (1995).
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thereof has used his best judgment, he has done all the law re-
quires."8 6 The standard is also sometimes expressed in a more ex-
panded version:
The generally accepted standard of professional liability is that a person who
holds himself or herself out to the public in a professional capacity is of aver-
age ability in the profession and will be presumed in law to (1) possess the
requisite degree of learning, skill, and experience ordinarily possessed by sim-
ilarly-situated professionals in the community, (2) use reasonable and ordi-
nary care and diligence in the exercise of this skill to accomplish the purpose
for which the professional is employed and (3) use his or her best judgment.8 7
Although significant issues arise in design malpractice cases relating
to such matters as the precise formulation or application of the profes-
sional standard of care,88 the nature of the evidence required to estab-
lish design malpractice,8 9 and causation issues in construction
cases, 90 those issues are not peculiarly relevant to an analysis of de-
sign liability arising out of specialty design-build. What are of imme-
diate interest, for reasons already suggested, 9 1 are the principles
established by the cases concerning the existence and extent of the
duty of care and related questions concerning the circumstances in
which a design professional may be held liable for the acts and omis-
sions of others or may be liable to those other than clients.
2. Design Professional's Duty of Care
A design professional's duty of care to the client serves as the com-
mon basis for imposing tort liability.92 The most direct application of
design malpractice principles arises when a design professional pro-
vides defective plans or specifications.93 Liability for design malprac-
tice, however, extends well beyond such instances. Design
86. Bayne v. Everham, 163 N.W. 1002, 1008 (Mich. 1917).
87. Robert L. Meyers, III et al., Risk Allocation From the Designer's Perspective, 452
PLI/REAL 129, 133 (2000).
88. A small number of authorities seem to hold a design professional to a higher stan-
dard under which the design professional effectively warrants that the design
services will be fit for the intended purposes. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.07;
Murray H. Wright & David E. Boelzner, Quantifying Liability under the Archi-
tect's Standard of Care, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1471 (1995). The standard in some
jurisdictions requires design professionals to stay abreast of new developments in
their professions. See Fain, supra note 85, at 35 n.15. Authorities also differ on
less fundamental issues, such as how to determine the locality or community ele-
ment of the standard. Meyers et al., supra note 87, at 135-36.
89. Although expert testimony is normally required to establish breach of the profes-
sional standard of care, courts differ in their recognition and application of excep-
tions to the general rule. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.06.
90. See Fain, supra note 85, at 37.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 57-78.
92. See, e.g., Minn. Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D.
Minn. 1998); see also supra section III.B.
93. See, e.g., Eggers Partnership, 82-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 15,630 (IBCA 1982) (finding
architect negligent in failing to provide specifications for installation of roofing
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professionals-project architects and project engineers in particular-
perform many other functions in connection with construction
projects. Nearly every professional service holds the potential for pro-
fessional malpractice liability. Professor Sweet has identified almost
three dozen common activities or circumstances that may give rise to
design malpractice claims.9 4 A few examples will help illustrate the
varied circumstances that may lead to design malpractice claims.
Design professionals frequently provide cost estimates or other
budget advice. While a design professional will not normally give as-
surances regarding project costs, 9 5 an architect or engineer who fur-
nishes estimates or other services relating to cost control must do so in
accordance with the professional standard of care. 9 6 The same stan-
dard applies to a design professional who agrees to supervise or in-
spect construction, 9 7  approve payments,9 s or perform other
professional services.99
An illustration of the relationship between the contractual scope of
services and the professional standard of care involves product, equip-
ment, and installation specifications. For example, an architect who
prepares specifications for the installation of manufactured products
and materials cannot necessarily avoid malpractice liability by relying
on the manufacturer's information and instructions if, under the cir-
cumstances, a reasonably diligent architect would have done other-
wise.1 00 This is so even though the architect is not a specialist in the
product or material involved. The special training and knowledge of
the architectural profession extends to decisions whether or not to rely
on the manufacturer's information and instructions.
Simply stated, design professionals must exercise a professional
level of care and diligence in performing all of the varied services they
perform. A particular design services agreement may establish a
more or less extensive scope of services, but each activity that calls for
the application of professional expertise also imposes on the design
material appropriate for the special conditions applicable to the project); Fain,
supra note 85, at 41-42.
94. SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.03.
95. See e.g., Durand Assoc., Inc. v. Guardian Inv. Co., 186 Neb. 349, 355, 183 N.W.2d
246, 251 (1971); Cobb v. Thomas, 565 S.W.2d 281, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978);
cf. Zannoth v. Booth Radio Stations, Inc., 52 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Mich. 1952) (en
banc) (architect not entitled to fee for preparing plans that far exceeded cost limi-
tations expressly imposed by the owner).
96. Durand Assoc., Inc., 186 Neb. at 351-55, 183 N.W.2d at 249-51.
97. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472, 476 (8th Cir.
1968).
98. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. 1967).
99. See Levin, supra note 53, § 4.03[D][2].
100. Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co., 341 P.2d 1083, 1087-88 (Or. 1959) (involving an error
in installation methods specified for substituted material as approved by the
manufacturer and a consultant).
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professional a duty of professional care coextensive with the contrac-
tual responsibility involved. This principle has important implica-
tions whenever a project A/E undertakes any role relating to specialty
design services provided by others.
3. Beyond Malpractice-Negligent Misrepresentation and Strict
Liability
Professional negligence is the most common tort theory for main-
taining a claim based on a design defect or error, but it is not the only
one. Although an extended analysis of alternative theories is beyond
the scope of this Article, it is important to note briefly their potential
relevance to claims arising out of specialty design defects and errors.
a. Negligent Misrepresentation
A negligent misrepresentation by a design professional may give
rise to liability.1o1 For example, under New York law, an engineer
may be liable for damages caused by the negligent preparation of a
report based on a negligent misrepresentation theory.10 2 Unless the
plaintiff and the engineer are in privity of contract, a negligent mis-
representation claim brought for recovery of pecuniary loss requires
"(1) awareness that the reports were to be used for a particular pur-
pose or purposes; (2) reliance by a known party or parties in further-
ance of that purpose; and (3) some conduct by the defendants linking
them to the party or parties and evincing defendant's understanding
of their reliance."o3 On a similar basis, in some jurisdictions, the
negligent performance of a contract by a design professional may give
rise to liability to another participant in the construction project who
is not the design professional's client.1o4
b. Strict Liability
Following the development of product liability theory, courts began
to consider applying the same analytic approach to defective design of
structures.'0 5 Some courts have articulated rationales that seem
101. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.08(D).
102. Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 539 N.E.2d 91
(N.Y. 1989).
103. Id. at 95.
104. M. Miller Co. v. Cent. Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Ca. Ct.
App. 1961) (finding prime contractor whose bid relied on soils report prepared for
owner could maintain claim against engineer for negligent preparation of the re-
port). Cf Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575,
582 (Ky. 2004) (finding contractor could maintain negligent misrepresentation
action against owner's construction manager for supplying faulty information).
105. See Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895, 898-99 (N.Y. 1957)
(holding that, under the theory announced in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916), privity was not required for a child, who fell off a porch
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broad enough to allow recovery on a strict liability theory for injury or
damage attributable to defective project design. For example, a Mis-
souri case applied product liability standards in holding that the
owner of a renovated underground warehouse stated a cause of action
against the participants who designed and installed defective refriger-
ation equipment in the warehouse. 10 6 The court held that, without
reference to negligence, the jury could find that support brackets used
by the defendants in the installation of the refrigeration system "were
defective in design when supplied and installed, which in that condi-
tion were unreasonably dangerous to plaintiff as a user."107 Although
the application of product liability principles to design defects could
presage a significant development in the law of specialty design liabil-
ity, the theory normally surfaces only in claims against defendants
who have functioned in a design-build role.10 8
4. Design Professional's Responsibility for Acts and Omissions of
Others
Under the design-bid-build system, the project A/E, although
trained and licensed only in one design discipline, customarily agrees
to provide all or substantially all of the design for the project and to
review or coordinate all or most of the design services provided by
others.10 9 Thus, an architect, with no engineering credentials, may
agree, as the owner's design professional for the project, to furnish all
of the civil, electrical, and mechanical engineering required for the
project and to review or take action with respect to design details and
submittals prepared by subcontractors, suppliers, and manufacturers.
The project architect retains engineering and other design consultants
to provide the design services outside the architect's expertise.
Under these circumstances, the project architect assumes a duty of
professional care toward the client that extends beyond the architec-
tural plans. The authorities are not entirely consistent in establishing
unprotected by a railing, to state a claim against the architect and builder who
constructed the residence, but that the allegations were insufficient to establish
that any defect in the porch was latent, as required under the McPherson case).
106. Commercial Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985).
107. Id.
108. See Levin, supra note 53, § 4.02[A]. Note also the similarity between strict liabil-
ity and the implied warranty when applied to design activities in cases involving
construction projects. See generally SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.07 (contrasting the
professional negligence theory, as followed in most jurisdictions with respect to
design liability, with the implied warranty theory adopted in a minority of juris-
dictions); see also infra Part III.
109. See Steven G. M. Stein, Architect's Duties and Responsibilities, in STEIN, CON-
STRUCTION LAW, supra note 10, § 5A.03 [2] [fl; Mirko A. Milicevich, Note, Con-
tracts: Liability of Architect to Owner for Defects in Plans Furnished by a
Consultant, 48 CAL. L. REV. 151 (1960).
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the boundaries of this additional duty.11o At a minimum, absent con-
tractual or statutory limits on liability, a project A/E whose contract
includes specialty design services furnished by consultants thereby as-
sumes a duty to the client to use care in selecting qualified consul-
tants. 1" If the contract provides for the project A/E to review,
approve, or coordinate designs by the consultants and to coordinate
the design work, the project A/E must do so in accordance with the
same professional standard of care that applies to the project A/E's
own design product. These principles governing the extent of duty
and the standard of care in such circumstances provide a critical
framework for analyzing liability issues that arise with specialty
design-build.
The project A/E's liability for a consultant's acts and omissions
may depend on whether the consultant is an agent of the project A/E
or an independent contractor. If a principle-agent relationship exists,
then the project A/E will be liable for the consultant's acts and omis-
sions even though the project A/E does not have the training and qual-
ifications required for performance of the specialized services.112
Under agency law, the status of the consultant as agent or indepen-
dent contractor will depend on such factors as the degree of supervi-
sion and control the project A/E exercises over the consultant.113
A written agreement for consulting services will likely characterize
the consultant as an independent contractor. Even in that instance,
however, a project A/E may be vicariously liable for the negligence of
design consultants retained as the project A/E's subcontractor. In
Johnson v. Salem Title Co.,114 the court viewed the project architect's
engineering consultant as an independent contractor, not an agent,
but the court held that the architect could be liable for the engineer's
negligence in furnishing a design that violated the building code be-
cause the architect had a non-delegable duty to design the project in
110. See Levin, supra note 53, § 4.02[D].
111. See John Grace & Co. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 472 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (holding, in third-party claim by owner against contractor's engi-
neering consultant, that finder of fact could reasonably conclude that the consult-
ant was professionally negligent for failing to inquire into the qualifications of a
manufacturer who specified inappropriate materials for use in heat exchangers
even though owner had recommended selection of the manufacturer), affd as
modified, 475 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1984) (adopting the concurring in part and dis-
senting in part opinion of three judges of the Appellate Division and ordering
dismissal of owner's third-party complaint against consultant on the basis that
there was no expert testimony in the record to support finding of malpractice);
Stein, supra note 109, § 5A.03[2] [f].
112. See Milicevich, supra note 109, at 154.
113. See id. at 156.
114. 425 P.2d 519 (Or. 1967).
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conformity with the code. 115 Some authorities seem to declare that
design services in general are non-delegable.1 1 6 However, even if a
project A/E may delegate specialty design responsibility to consultants
serving as independent contractors, the project A/E remains contrac-
tually obligated to the owner for all of the services included in the
agreement with the owner. These overlapping principles create a de-
gree of uncertainty with regard to the liability of the project A/E for
the acts and omissions of specialty design consultants. Despite this
uncertainty, except in the case of a non-delegable duty, a project A/E
should not be vicariously liable for specialty design in the common sit-
uation in which the prime contractor or a subcontractor, not the pro-
ject AlE, hires the specialty designer.
5. Liability to Third Parties
Few socially beneficial endeavors involve greater risk of harm than
building construction. Construction workers, remote users, consum-
ers, and members of the general public can neither avoid the risks
involved nor protect themselves by contract. For these, tort law must
intervene, and the courts must struggle to resolve important policy
issues that control the outer limits of tort liability.
a. From Privity to Duty
Historically, the courts limited the liability of a design professional
for professional errors and omissions solely to the party who retained
the professional. 117 This restriction reflected the legal concept of priv-
ity.118 The same rule has been applied to other instances of profes-
sional liability: the legal relationship upon which liability rests is that
of professional and client.119
In a traditional design-bid-build setting in which the owner hired
the project A/E, the older cases generally limited the design profes-
sional's liability to the owner-client. In most construction projects,
many other persons are at risk from design errors and omissions, but
the privity concept left them largely without recourse. Thus, the his-
torical privity concept shielded the design professional from liability to
third parties for negligent professional services.
One not party to the design contract might seek a route around the
privity roadblock by claiming to be a third-party beneficiary, but that
115. Id. at 523. For a more detailed discussion of the application of the non-delegable
duty exception to the independent contractor rule, see subsection III.E.2.
116. See Stein, supra note 109, § 5A.03 [2] [f].
117. For a historical perspective on the liability of architects and engineers based on
negligence principles, see Fain, supra note 85; Note, supra note 6.
118. See Fain, supra note 85, at 39; Note, supra note 6, at 1077, 1081-82.
119. Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a lawyer's duties
should not extend to persons he never represented).
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route often proves to be a narrow one. 120 The courts have not often
been receptive to this argument in construction cases. 12 1 An Iowa
case in which a prime contractor sued the owner's project engineer for
allegedly preparing defective plans and specifications reflects a tradi-
tional third-party beneficiary analysis. The court held that to main-
tain a breach of contract claim against the engineer the contractor had
to establish that the owner intended to satisfy the owner's obligations
to the contractor by contracting for the engineer's services. 12 2
The court quoted from Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Construc-
tion Co. 123 for the traditional doctrine allowing third-party contract
rights only to donee beneficiaries (i.e., the contract promisee intends
to make a gift to the third party via the contract) and creditor benefi-
ciaries ("performance of the promise will satisfy an actual or supposed
or asserted duty of the promisee to beneficiary"). 124 All others who
may benefit from the contract are merely incidental beneficiaries who
have no legal rights. Contemporary cases may de-emphasize the
traditional labels, but they continue to deny third-party remedies if
the evidence merely shows that the contract will benefit a third party
but not that the parties intended third-party benefits.1 25
The privity defense in negligent design liability cases fell under
attack and began to crumble early in the second half of the twentieth
century as courts expanded the theoretical underpinnings of the prod-
ucts liability movement. 126 In 1958, the United States District Court
120. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Constr. Co., 825 A.2d 72, 86 (Conn. 2003)
(holding that an injured worker is not a beneficiary of inspection contract);
Shroyer v. County of Mecklenburg, 571 S.E.2d 849, 850 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that a homeowner is not a beneficiary of design-build subcontract for
septic system); Blecick v. Sch. Dist. No. 18, 406 P.2d 750, 755 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1965) (holding that a prime contractor is not a beneficiary under contract be-
tween owner and project architect), overruled by Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/
Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ariz. 1984) (overruling Blecick to the extent
that it holds that a contractor may not recover in tort from an architect for negli-
gent preparation of plans).
121. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.08(B).
122. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376, 392-93 (S.D. Iowa
1973).
123. 144 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Iowa 1966).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Pelletier, 825 A.2d at 86 (noting the test to be whether contracting par-
ties mutually intended promisor to assume a direct obligation to the third party);
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 99 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004) (deny-
ing third-party status in absence of evidence that the parties expressed an intent
to benefit the third party).
126. See, e.g., Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 143 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1957); United
States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958). See generally Wil-
liam L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960) (describing the declining use of privity defense in prod-
uct liability cases); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV.
791 (1966) (continuing his previous discussion, Prosser speaks further on the in-
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for the Southern District of California held that privity should no
longer be required for a malpractice claim against an architect, noting
that tort liability
to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing
of various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
... Altogether too much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the
hands of the supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty im-
posed by law to perform without negligence his functions as they affect the
contractor. The power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount to
a power of economic life or death over the contractor. It is only just that such
authority, exercised in such a relationship, carry commensurate legal
responsibility. 127
Many later cases confirm the erosion of the privity shield for design
professionals.1 28 This movement has greatly increased the exposure of
design professionals to third-party claims, but it has not left them de-
fenseless. Rather, abandonment of the formalistic defense based on
privity brought to the forefront the need for thoughtful analysis when-
ever a court considers whether or not to impose on a design profes-
sional a legal duty of professional care in favor of someone who has no
contract rights in relation to the design professional. In particular,
many cases turn on whether a design professional's contractual obli-
gation to a client creates a relationship between the design profes-
sional and a third party that is sufficient to create a professional duty
of care.
b. Personal Injury Cases
Cases involving personal injury to construction workers or mem-
bers of the public present the duty question in a setting familiar to
tort law. Courts have recognized a duty in favor of the injured person
if, but only if, the design professional's contractual role supports a le-
gal duty of care in relation to the person and injury involved.129
crease of products liability cases and the decline of the use of the privity defense
in these cases).
127. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 135-36 (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d
16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (rejecting the privity defense)).
128. See Jeffrey L. Nischwitz, Note, The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity:
Evolution and Expansion of Liability to Third Parties, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 217
(1984).
129. See, e.g., Black v. Gorman-Rupp, 791 So. 2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Baker v.
Sweet Assocs., Inc., 717 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Domenech v. Associ-
ated Eng'rs, 683 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Harvey v. Sear-Brown Group,
692 N.Y.S.2d 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Herczeg v. Hampton Township Mun.
Auth., 766 A.2d 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
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Courts often exonerate design professionals from liability to in-
jured construction workers by concluding that a design professional
has no duty relating to job safety if the architectural services contract
does not extend to on-site safety. 1 30 This defense may apply even to
an inspecting engineer who is present at the time of an accident and
who allegedly knew that certain working conditions were both unsafe
and contrary to his firm's engineering specifications. 13 1 Another court
adopted a similar analysis in a personal injury case against an archi-
tect who gratuitously advised a public body concerning actions to ar-
rest deterioration of a county courthouse.13 2 The court held that the
narrow purpose of the architect's voluntary services was insufficient
to create a duty to the injured man even if a reasonably prudent archi-
tect should have noticed the unsafe condition that caused the injury.
Just as the limited scope of the design professionals' contractual
duty may exonerate a design professional from a duty to a third party,
an expanded scope of engagement may create a duty in favor of a third
party. Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc. 13 3 arose out of the construction of the
Washington D.C. metropolitan subway system. The transit authority
contracted with Bechtel for engineering services, including "safety en-
gineering services." 134 The plaintiff, a construction worker who con-
tracted silicosis working in the subway tunnel, alleged that Bechtel
was aware or should have known of the dangers posed to workers by
the high levels of silica dust and inadequate ventilation but failed to
take steps to protect workers from the risk. The court framed the is-
sue as whether Bechtel's contractual role "created a special relation-
ship between Bechtel and Caldwell under which Bechtel owed a duty
to Caldwell to take reasonable steps to protect him from the foresee-
able risk to his health posed by the dust laden Metro tunnels."13 5 The
court held that it did.
Bechtel placed itself in the position of assuming a duty to appellant in tort.
The particular circumstances of this case, including the Bechtel-WMATA con-
tract, Bechtel's superior skills and position, and Bechtel's resultant ability to
foresee the harm that might reasonably be expected to befall appellant, cre-
130. See, e.g., Black, 791 So. 2d at 796 (finding that a contract that provided for an
engineer to prepare plans and monitor prime contractor's work for compliance
with plans did not impose responsibility on engineer for site safety); Krieger v.
J.E. Greiner Co., 382 A.2d 1069, 1079 (Md. 1978) (finding that contract imposed
no duty on engineers to supervise the methods of construction); Brown v. Gamble
Constr. Co., 537 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a project ar-
chitect had no duty to supervise safety precautions during construction absent
specific contractual obligation); Baker, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (finding that a project
engineer's contract created duties solely to the owner and not to an injured con-
struction worker).
131. Herczeg, 766 A.2d at 874 (affirming the dismissal of a wrongful death action).
132. Peeler v. DeWitt, 3 S.W.3d 894, 895-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
133. 631 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
134. Id. at 992.
135. Id. at 993.
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ated a duty in Bechtel to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to appellant
from the hazardous conditions of the subway tunnels.136
A project A/E with on-site responsibilities may have a duty to protect
construction workers if the design services agreement creates a role
for the design professional that is sufficient to establish a special re-
sponsibility for job safety. 13 7 To some considerable extent, the impact
of this line of cases may have been mitigated by modifications in the
most popular forms of industry contracts that now routinely, and in
express terms, exclude site safety from the project A/E's responsibili-
ties and more plainly place responsibility for construction means and
methods exclusively on the prime contractor and the subcontractors
who perform the work.13s
The historic demise of privity bequeathed the determination of tort
liability for design errors to evolving notions of duty. As the court
stated in Caldwell: "Unlike contractual duties, which are imposed by
agreement of the parties to a contract, a duty of due care under tort
law is based primarily upon social policy .... "139 The court next dis-
cussed to whom a duty is owed: "While in contract law, only one to
whom the contract specifies that a duty be rendered will have a cause
of action for its breach, in tort law, society, not the contract, specifies
to whom the duty is owed, and this has traditionally been the foresee-
able plaintiff."140
The liability of design professionals to third parties depends prima-
rily on a duty analysis under tort law. While the duty analysis in per-
sonal injury claims by third-parties involves relatively simple policy
considerations, claims not involving personal injury inexorably move
the analysis toward the outer boundaries of tort law.
c. Property Damage and Pecuniary Interest Claims
Design malpractice may damage the property and economic inter-
ests of multiple participants, including those who have no client rela-
tionship with the design professional. For example, no matter who
136. Id. at 997. Although Bechtel's contractual role went beyond the normal responsi-
bilities of an owner's project engineer and specifically included on-site safety, Pro-
fessor Sweet characterizes Caldwell as a case adopting an expansive view of the
duties of a project A/E. SWEET, supra note 6, §14.08.
137. See, e.g., Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 325 A.2d 432, 443-44 (Md. 1974) (finding
the additional supervisory duties taken on by the A/E exposed him to liability for
the death of a construction worker); Simon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 189 Neb.
183, 201-02, 202 N.W.2d 157, 168-69 (1972) (holding that because architectural
firm undertook supervisory role at construction site, it had a duty to protect the
safety of the workers at that site).
138. The American Institute of Architects many years ago introduced changes to its
form documents to de-emphasize the role of the architect in matters such as
safety and supervision of construction activity. Note, supra note 6, at 1086.
139. Caldwell, 631 F.2d at 997-98.
140. Id. at 998.
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provides the structural design for a project, many of the project par-
ticipants depend on the integrity of the resulting structural compo-
nents. Similarly, the ability of a trade to complete its work may
depend on design services provided by the project A/E or a specialty
designer retained by another trade. Furthermore, many participants
must depend upon one another to maintain the project schedule. The
risk of property damage or economic loss in all these situations is both
significant and foreseeable.
These circumstances produce many situations in which a design
participant's contractual obligations arguably create a special rela-
tionship in favor of a non-client participant that would justify the rec-
ognition of a duty of care. A participant who is responsible for a
defective design may be liable in tort for damages caused to the prop-
erty of another participant whether or not the two participants share
a contractual relationship. 14 1
These principles become more complex when professional negli-
gence causes purely economic damages to another project participant.
Recognition of a duty of care is a critical policy determination involved
in these cases, but it is not the only one.
d. The Economic Loss Rule
The courts developed the economic loss rule in product liability
cases to limit the class of plaintiffs who might seek damages by reason
of defective products.142 As originally developed in that context, the
rule holds that a plaintiff who suffers no personal injury or property
damage may not recover for purely economic loss caused by a defective
product.14 3 Eventually, some courts applied an analogous rule to
limit recovery for purely economic loss in connection with other tort
claims, including design professional malpractice claims.144
Although courts may apply the economic loss rule to bar tort claims
brought by one contracting party against the other,145 in construction
claims the doctrine has the greatest significance with respect to tort
claims brought by a plaintiff who has no contractual relationship with
141. Commercial Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985) (finding owner of facility did state cause of action against subcontrac-
tors who designed and built defective refrigeration system that caused damage to
merchandise stored at the facility).
142. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
143. Moorman Mfg. Co., 435 N.E.2d 443.
144. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1984); 2314 Lincoln Park W.
Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. 1990).
145. See, e.g., Joseph v. David M. Schwarz/Architectural Servs., P.C., 957 F. Supp.
1334 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836 (Haw.
1998).
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the defendant.146 The application of the economic loss rule has even
resurrected privity of contract as a relevant factor in design liability
cases.147 Most authorities, however, would probably agree that "[tihe
crux of the doctrine is not privity but the premise that economic inter-
ests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort
principles."148
Some courts decline to apply the economic loss rule to preclude re-
covery in tort against a design professional.149 Where the courts have
rejected the economic loss rule as a bar to recovery against design pro-
fessionals, the scope of the services for which the design professional
is retained has often helped to define the extent of the duty and to
identify those to whom the professional owes a duty of care. For ex-
ample, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a project architect who
had responsibility under a contract to certify payments to the general
contractor had a duty to the subcontractors to ensure that the general
contractor furnished a statutorily required payment bond before certi-
fying the payments.150
There is much debate over the application of the economic loss rule
to claims arising out of design and construction activities.151 Spe-
146. See, e.g., Joseph, 957 F. Supp. 1334; Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla.
1999); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding,
Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85 (S.C. 1995); Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994).
147. IT Corp. v. Ecology & Envtl. Eng'g, P.C., 713 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
In that case the prime contractor sued the owner's engineer for damages the
prime contractor allegedly suffered because the bidding documents the engineer
prepared did not accurately reflect the relevant site conditions. In affirming the
trial court's dismissal of the contractor's claim founded on negligence and negli-
gent misrepresentation, the court of appeals held:
It is well settled that engineers, like other professionals, may be held
liable for economic injury arising from the negligent preparation of a re-
port. However, 'before a party may recover in tort for pecuniary loss sus-
tained as a result of another's negligent misrepresentations there must
be a showing that there was either actual privity of contract between the
parties or a relationship so close as to approach that of privity.'
Id. at 636 (citations omitted).
148. Martha Crandall Coleman, Liability of Design Professionals for Negligent Design
and Project Management, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 923, 934 (1998) (quoting Sidney R.
Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 895 (1989)).
149. See, e.g., Boren v. Thompson & Assoc., 999 P.2d 438 (Okla. 2000); Tommy L. Grif-
fin Plumbing & Heating Co., 463 S.E.2d at 88.
150. Boren, 999 P.2d 438.
151. See Steven B. Lesser, Economic Loss Doctrine and Its Impact Upon Construction
Claims, CONSTRUCTION LAw., Aug. 1994, at 21; Michael T. Terwilliger, Economic
Loss in the Construction Context: Should Architects be Liable For the Commercial
Expectations of the Contractors?, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 257 (1996); Emily M. Usow,
Redefining the Professional Service Contract: The Evolution and Deconstruction
of Florida's Economic Loss Rule, 8 U. MiAMi Bus. L. REV. 1 (1999). For a discus-
sion of the economic loss rule in products liability cases, see Comment, Manufac-
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cialty design-build will inevitably lead to further debate as partici-
pants in the construction process seek redress for purely economic loss
caused by other participants.
D. Bargained-For Limits on Design Liability-A Return to
Contract Principles
Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, developments in
tort law have expanded professional liability for design errors and de-
fects.15 2 The increasingly complex nature of construction , as well as
the demand for accelerated project schedules and more highly special-
ized design and construction techniques, have contributed to the lia-
bility risk for design professionals. One logical response proposed by
those who advise design professionals is exculpatory provisions in de-
sign services contracts.' 5 3 Advocates for design professionals argue
that contracts should allocate the risk of liability to the design profes-
sional only if the risk is within the design professional's control and
the design professional is compensated for assuming the risk.154
Common methods to limit a design professional's liability by con-
tract include: capping damage liability; limiting damage liability to
the amount of available insurance coverage; excluding liability for
lost profits and other special damages; limiting liability for design er-
rors exclusively to the obligation to correct errors rather than to pay
damages; and permitting the design professional to pay a liquidated
amount to compensate the client for a shortfall in project perform-
ance. 15 5 Courts will often uphold the enforceability of contractual lia-
bility limits in agreements between commercially sophisticated
parties.156 However, liability limitations in consumer contracts may
be unenforceable,15 7 especially in contracts for residential construc-
tion.1 5 8 Also, the public policies that underlie the licensing and regu-
turers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss" Damages-Tort or
Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966); Note, Economic Loss in Products Liabil-
ity Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917 (1966).
152. See generally SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.01; Fain, supra note 85, at 32-33.
153. SWEET, supra note 6, § 15.03.
154. See AVA J. ABRAMOWITZ, ARCHITECT'S ESSENTIALS OF CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
(2002).
155. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 15.03(D); Susan R. Brooke, Protecting Design-Builder
with Appropriate Contract Clauses, in DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTING HANDBOOK,
supra note 9, § 11.6. For a discussion of contractual limits on liability and sample
contract provisions used in owner-contractor agreements, see Charles M. Sink &
Mark D. Petersen, Indirect, Consequential and Punitive Damages, in 2 CON-
STRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 4, §§ 31.01-.06.
156. See, e.g., Vathal Corp. v. Sullivan Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 195 (3rd Cir. 1995);
Markborough Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 277 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
157. See, e.g., Estey v. MacKenzie Engg, Inc., 927 P.2d 86 (Or. 1996), rev'g 902 P.2d
1220 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
158. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 15.03(D).
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lation of design professionals impose some countervailing
considerations.159 Safety considerations may dictate that construc-
tion plans be prepared by licensed, qualified professionals who retain
liability for design errors.1 60 Even after giving each of these consider-
ations due regard, in many jurisdictions the parties should generally
be free to negotiate efficient limits on liability, provided that they do
so deliberately and clearly.
E. Contractual Reallocation of Design Responsibility
Another response on behalf of project A/Es to the expanded risk of
design liability is to re-allocate responsibility for specialty designs to
others. One method is to delegate certain design responsibilities to
parties having expertise in the specialty work.161 An alternative is to
define narrowly the scope of the design professional's responsibility so
that the project A/E's contractual scope of services does not include
certain specialty design components. 16 2 These alternatives may pro-
duce markedly different results under contract law.
Delegation does not strip the delegating party of the original con-
tractual responsibility, although it may substantially alleviate the
risk of tort liability for negligent performance of the design ser-
vices.163 By contrast, if the contract with the project A/E wholly ex-
cludes the specialty design from the project A/E's scope of work, then
arguably the project A/E may completely avoid any risk of liability as-
sociated with the specialty design. This potentially powerful exculpa-
tory approach is consistent with the specialty design-build trend in
construction. The crux of the movement toward specialty de-
sign-build is the judgment that it is often more efficient and techni-
cally sound to divide design tasks among several trade specialists
rather than to place global design responsibility in a project A/E. Spe-
cialty design-build expressly shifts specialty design responsibility
from the project A/E to the specialty trades. If, by this contractual
device, the participants in the construction process pass down to trade
subcontractors a part of the design responsibility traditionally as-
159. See infra section V.B.
160. See generally Michael D. Turner, Paradigms, Pigeonholes, and Precedent: Reflec-
tion on Regulatory Control of Residential Construction, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 3
(2001).
161. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. URS Co., No. 64496, 1994 WL 520862 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 648 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1995) (in-
volving delegation of planetarium dome design).
162. See St. Paul Cos. v. Constr. Mgmt. Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Mont. 2000) (in-
volving an owner who contracted directly with specialty trades, rather than pri-
mary design-builder, for wiring of pool controls, garage doors and sound system).
For a discussion of the AIA Allocation Clause, which provides for this method of
allocating design responsibility, see text accompanying infra notes 256-57.
163. See infra subsection III.E.1.
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sumed by a project A/E, they may in that manner also limit the project
AlE's duty to the other participants in the construction project and to
members of the public who may suffer loss or damage due to design
errors. As the discussion that follows shows, however, there are im-
portant policy limitations on the extent to which a design professional
can avoid liability through delegation.
1. Delegation of Design Duties under Contract Law
A party to a contract generally may delegate that party's contrac-
tual duties to another. 164 As between the original obligor and the
party who accepts the delegation, the latter is liable for performance
of the delegated duty.165 This does not, however, mean that a design
professional can effectively avoid liability for a contractual design
duty by delegating that duty to another.
When a duty is delegated, however, the delegating party continues to remain
liable. If this were not so, every solvent person could obtain freedom from his
debts by delegating them to an insolvent. Delegation involves the appoint-
ment by the obligor of another to render performance on his behalf. It does
not free the obligor from his duty to see to it that performance is rendered. 166
As a result, a project A/E who wishes to be exonerated completely from
liability for a specialty design service generally cannot do so by enter-
ing into a contract with the owner to furnish that service and then
delegating the specialty design to another. 16 7
2. Delegation of Design Duties under Tort Law
As cases already discussed show, once a design professional agrees
to provide services, tort law imposes a duty to render those services in
accordance with the controlling standard of professional care. 16 8
Under the law governing independent contractors, however, a party
who assumes a design duty by contract and then delegates that duty
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1981).
165. 17 Vista Fee Assoc. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n., 693 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (involving a design-builder who, after settling building owner's
claims arising from a defective smoke purge system, had a common law indem-
nity claim against its engineering subcontractor).
166. Commercial Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 667-68
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting CALAMAi AND PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 18-24 (2d ed. 1977) (finding a subcontractor who agreed in its contract with the
prime contractor to design and build a refrigeration system remained liable for
the portion of the work further subcontracted to a mechanical firm).
167. See St. Paul Cos., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (finding that a builder and affiliated
architects could not avoid their contractual duty to build a quality residence by
engaging an independent contractor (subcontractor) to perform the work); Gui-
lani v. Penny, Nos. 95-0175, 95-0163, 1998 WL 1198695 (Mass. Super. Aug. 20,
1998) (holding that contracting party remains liable no matter who performs the
contract obligation).
168. See supra section III.B.
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to an independent contractor should not normally be responsible for
damages caused by the independent contractor's negligence. 169 Con-
versely, when a specialty firm agrees by subcontract with the prime
contractor to undertake a portion of the project design work, the spe-
cialty firm may be liable to the prime contractor for the damages at-
tributable to the negligence of the specialty firm in performing the
delegated design services.170
Public policy considerations introduce a further complication when
a design professional delegates a design duty imposed under tort law.
Courts sometimes declare certain duties imposed by tort law to be
non-delegable.171 In construction and design cases, the non-delegable
duty analysis often applies if the damage or injury arises out of the
violation of a statute17 2 or administrative code or regulation173 relat-
ing to safety. The same argument may apply to delegation of a con-
tractual duty. 174 This does not mean that the person upon whom tort
law imposes the duty cannot discharge that duty through an agent or
independent contractor. Rather, it means that the duty is such that
the person primarily responsible for performance of the duty will be
vicariously liable for performance by the designee, even if the designee
is an independent contractor.175
3. Delegation of Design Duties under Professional Licensing
Law
Licensing statutes and regulations may impose non-delegable du-
ties on design professionals. Arguably, this is an implicit effect of li-
censing schemes that prohibit unlicensed persons from performing
professional services except if they do so under the direction of a li-
censed professional.176 One court offered a categorical argument for
non-delegable design duties by declaring that when an architect "un-
169. See Milicevich, supra note 109.
170. 17 Vista Fee Assoc., 693 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60 (concluding that, in addition to in-
demnity claim, prime contractor had malpractice claim against engineering firm
that contracted with prime contractor to perform services).
171. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 337 (2001).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Johnson v. Salem Title Co., 425 P.2d 519 (Or. 1967) (holding that project
architect who delegated structural design to an engineering consultant had non-
delegable duty to satisfy the structural design requirements of the building code).
174. See Block v. Lohan Assoc., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (involving a
plaintiff who argued that a precast concrete specialty firm had a non-delegable
duty under its contract for the design, fabrication, and installation of concrete
panels, but the court did not reach that argument).
175. See DOBBS, supra note 171, § 337.
176. See State Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Eng'rs v. Rogers, 120 So. 2d 772, 775
(Miss. 1960).
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dertakes a project, he alone will be held responsible therefor. If he
delegates any part of his duties, he does so at his peril."177
Even if the licensing scheme itself does not imply that all profes-
sional services subject to the licensing requirement impose non-dele-
gable duties on the project A/E, a court may conclude that statutes or
regulations that require a professional seal on certain design docu-
ments impose a non-delegable duty of care on the licensee whose seal
appears on the documents. Some licensing laws expressly provide
that a design professional who affixes his or her seal to a design docu-
ment accepts full responsibility for the document, even if it was pre-
pared by another.178
In Duncan v. Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers
and Land Surveyors,179 the court upheld the revocation of the license
of Jack Gillum, a supervising engineer whose seal was affixed to struc-
tural drawings that were the basis for the fabricator's shop drawings
that provided for a defective design.so The court held that the provi-
sions of the licensing statutes governing the use of a professional seal
imposed a non-delegable duty on Gillum with regard to the structural
components of the project, including changes to steel connections in-
troduced by the fabricator's shop drawings, because Gillum was the
project's supervising structural engineer. This was so even though
Gillum's seal apparently was not on the shop drawings themselves
and even though another licensed engineer working under Gillum had
direct responsibility to approve the shop drawings that provided for
the defective design.' 8
The Duncan court's holding was based on public policy considera-
tions in light of a statute providing that an engineer who sealed any
plans for an engineering project was responsible for the entire project
absent the engineer's signed statement identifying the specific plans
for the project the engineer intended to authenticate by his seal and
expressly disclaiming responsibility for all other plans in connection
with the project.' 8 2 The court held that the responsibility for the
structural integrity of the steel connections was a non-delegable duty,
although the court did not explain the basis for that holding.' 8 3
177. Id. (dictum).
178. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 327.411 (2001). Cf In re Reilly v. Bd. of Regents, 672
N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding an engineer properly disciplined for
failing to maintain detailed records required under regulation with regard to
plans prepared by another and sealed by the engineer).
179. 744 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
180. Id. at 537.
181. See id. at 542.
182. Id. at 535-36, 542. The statute has since been amended. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 327.411 (2001), which is discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 269-71.
183. Duncan, 744 S.W.2d at 541. In support of this holding, the court cited State
Board of Registration for Professional Engineers v. Rogers, 120 So. 2d 772 (Miss.
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4. The Implications of the Non-Delegable Design Duty
When a court declares that a professional design duty is non-dele-
gable, as the Duncan court did with respect to the structural engi-
neer's duty for the steel connections, the court gives notice of an
important restriction on ordinary freedom of contract principles. Pub-
lic safety and welfare considerations require safeguards to ensure the
safety of structures, and contractual delegation cannot evade that re-
quirement. This public policy does not, however, necessarily require
that all design responsibility must rest on a single professional. As
previously noted, the most common project delivery systems involve a
project A/E who undertakes contractual responsibility to the owner for
the entire project, but who normally retains several design consul-
tants to provide specialty design. This was the case in the project in-
volved in the Duncan case. The owner hired a project architect to
furnish all of the normal architectural and engineering services, and
the architect in turn retained the structural engineer as a consult-
ant.18 4 Presumably, the project architect did not have the training,
experience, or license to provide structural engineering. The architect
merely had a contractual duty to furnish structural engineering for
the project to the owner; at least so far as one can determine from the
Duncan opinion, the duty was delegable by the architect.
The notion of a non-delegable design duty raises several questions
relevant to the specialty design-build practice and other forms of
shared design responsibility. Under what circumstances should a
court declare a design duty non-delegable? Does public policy limit
the freedom to divide design responsibility into multiple layers? May
a licensed design professional delegate a contractual design duty to
another licensed design professional? One might argue that the par-
ties to the project contracts should be free to divide design responsibil-
ity in any way they deem appropriate so long as all critical design
functions are performed by professionals licensed for the design activi-
ties involved. In a given case, however, the evidence might establish
that a single licensed professional must retain ultimate responsibility
for certain related design functions or at least for their coordination
into an integrated design.
The concept of a non-delegable design duty may portend extraordi-
nary implications for analyzing liability in cases of design details fur-
nished by subcontractors and specialty firms. To the extent that the
design responsibility of a project architect or project engineer is non-
delegable on public policy grounds, any division of design responsibil-
1960), a case in which the state regulatory agency sought to enjoin the unlicensed
practice of engineering. The statement by the Mississippi Supreme Court con-
cerning the non-delegable nature of design duties is dicta. See id. at 775.
184. Duncan, 744 S.W.2d at 527 n.2.
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ity may leave at risk those design professionals who have (either by
contract or by virtue of professional responsibility) any authority or
responsibility to review, approve, or coordinate the final detailed
design.
F. Shared Design Services-Blurring the Lines of
Responsibility
Whenever multiple participants work in concert on a construction
project, each participant faces a liability risk for resulting defects. If
design responsibility in a design-bid-build project is shared, the pro-
ject A/E will almost always be implicated to some extent by a duty to
review, approve, coordinate, or at least advise the owner with respect
to the design services provided by others. Additionally, when the de-
sign defect involves services of a subcontractor, the prime contractor is
at risk, as is any subcontractor at a tier above that of the subcontrac-
tor who provided the design.
A residential construction case 8 5 provides an interesting illustra-
tion. The defendants included Construction Management Company,
Ltd., which was the builder, Nick Fullerton Architects, P.C., and Nick
Fullerton individually. Apparently, Nick Fullerton was directly in-
volved with the ownership or operation of both Construction Manage-
ment and Nick Fullerton Architects, P.C. The court referred to Nick
Fullerton and Nick Fullerton Architects, P.C. collectively as the "Ful-
lerton defendants." Even though the contract between the owner and
Construction Management was a design-build arrangement, 8 6 the
opinion addressed some issues that are fundamental to the analysis of
specialty design-build in a design-bid-build project.
An electrical fire destroyed the residence when construction was
approximately ninety percent complete. The owner's insurance com-
pany paid the owner under the policy, settled with the electrical sub-
contractor who allegedly caused the fire by negligent installation of
wiring, and then brought a subrogation action against Construction
Management and related entities involved in the project.18 7 The court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Among other
things, the court held that a general contractor could be vicariously
liable to the owner for the negligence of the subcontractor who had the
status, under Montana law, of the general contractor's independent
185. St. Paul Cos. v. Constr. Mgmt. Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Mont. 2000).
186. Id. at 1095. The opinion states that the Fullerton defendants designed the resi-
dence and that Construction Management, which was operated by Nick Fullerton
and another individual, served as the general contractor. Id. Presumably, Con-
struction Management had the direct contract with the owners for design and
construction of the residence and the Fullerton defendants furnished the design
to Construction Management.
187. Id. at 1095 n.2, 1096.
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contractor.' 8 8 In stating the basis for this holding, the court did not
seem to distinguish between the vicarious liability of Construction
Management, which presumably entered into the subcontract with
the allegedly negligent electrical subcontractor, and the Fullerton de-
fendants, who apparently only provided design services for the project.
It is not clear how the Fullerton defendants, if they only furnished
design services, could be vicariously liable for the negligence of Con-
struction Management's subcontractor.189
In the instant case, it is indisputable that Construction Management and the
Fullerton defendants had an agreement with the Ericksons to design and
build a home. In Montana, a contractor has a common law duty to construct a
home in a good and workmanlike manner. Thus, the agreement for construc-
tion of the home imposed upon Construction Management and the Fullerton
defendants a duty to build the home in a good and workmanlike manner.
They are not permitted to avoid this duty simply by engaging the services of
others to fulfill their obligation to perform. 1 9 0
In a holding of potentially greater significance for cases involving spe-
cialty design-build, the court also denied the Fullerton defendants'
motion for partial summary judgment on'the plaintiffs negligence
claim. The court held that the plaintiff presented genuine issues of
material fact regarding the involvement of the related defendants in
the project as a whole. The court noted the plaintiffs argument that
it is not alleging negligence in design services rendered by the Fullerton de-
fendants. Rather, it argues, its negligence claim flows from its contention that
the Fullerton defendants played a broader role in the construction of the
home, including the design, creation and construction of the home contained
in the design/build concept the defendants employed in producing the
home.191
The court held that "genuine issues of material fact exist regarding
the involvement of the Fullerton defendants in the home construction
project as a whole that preclude the summary dismissal of St. Paul's
negligence claim."192 This cryptic holding may suggest, by analogy,
that when a design professional provides services to a design-build
subcontractor, as commonly occurs with specialty design-build, the
188. Id. at 1097. The court characterized this issue as one of first impression under
Montana law. Id. at 1096.
189. Perhaps the court viewed Construction Management and the Fullerton defend-
ants as joint venturers, however, that reading cannot be easily reconciled with
the court's statement that Construction Management, as the "general contrac-
tor," hired the electrical subcontractor. Id. at 1097. The court also explained in a
footnote that Nick Fullerton and Nick Fullerton Architects, P.C. each held a one-
third ownership interest in Construction Management, but the court did not sug-
gest that this fact alone could make the Fullerton defendants vicariously liable
for the negligence of Construction Management's subcontractor. See id. n.3.
190. Id. at 1097 (citations omitted). Arguably, the opinion's greatest significance is
that it reflects a consumer protection bias for residential construction. See infra
note 323 and accompanying text.
191. St. Paul Cos., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 1098-99.
192. Id. at 1099.
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design professional could be liable for the subcontractor's defective
work. 193
Although reported cases are only beginning to consider the legal
ramifications of specialty design-build, the construction industry has
significant experience with diffused design responsibility through the
long-standing process of finalizing certain design details through shop
drawings. Cases involving defective shop drawings provide a helpful
analogy for considering liability issues that arise under the specialty
design-build practice.
G. The Shop Drawing Cases-Prelude to Specialty
Design-Build
Shop drawings are plans and other graphic data prepared by the
prime contractor or a specialty subcontractor, supplier, manufacturer,
or fabricator to illustrate fabrication, installation, or construction de-
tails.194 For example, shop drawings may provide the type and size of
connectors between two components of an assembly, electrical, and
mechanical line sizes and similar matters. The shop drawing process
recognizes that a project architect cannot "completely cover the con-
structive details of all the trades employed upon the work" or accu-
rately speak "the language of the very shop in which the work is to be
made."19 5
The shop drawing process differs from the specialty design-build
process primarily in degree. Although specialty design-build shifts
the design function for a project component more completely to the
construction team, while shop drawings involve more limited design
details omitted from the project A/E's plans, both processes raise simi-
193. The court also held that the plaintiff could pursue a claim under the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine. Id. at 1097-98. While that holding is not relevant for purposes
of this Article, the facts the defendants cited on the issue are. The owners con-
tracted directly with five additional specialty trades that installed electrical wir-
ing for the home for different purposes. Thus, even in the residential context,
multiple contractual arrangements involving related construction and design
functions may add significant complexity to liability issues.
194. See Trataros Constr., Inc. v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 2001-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 31,306,
2001 WL 171294 (Gen. Servs. Adm. B.C.A. 2001) (involving a contract that pro-
vided for shop drawings showing in detail the proposed fabrication and assembly
of structural elements and the installation of materials, including attachment de-
tails); see also AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201Tm-1997,
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, § 3.12.1 (1997) [here-
inafter AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS] (defining shop drawings to include drawings
and other data from the prime contractor, trade subcontractors, or suppliers that
illustrate parts of the construction). For a further discussion of the use of shop
drawings in the context of a traditional project design process, see Ellickson,
supra note 2.
195. See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 614 (quoting AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS,
THE HANDBOOK OF ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE 65 (1920)).
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lar legal issues by providing for shared design responsibility between
the design team and the construction team. As a result, the con-
tracting practices and case law developed concerning shop drawings
are relevant to many specialty design-build issues.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation establishes the prevailing fed-
eral contract provision governing the shop drawing process.1 9 6 That
provision (the "Federal Shop Drawing Clause") requires the prime
contractor to coordinate, review and approve all shop drawings. Al-
though the government's contracting officer must also approve or dis-
approve the shop drawings, that action does not relieve the contractor
from responsibility for the shop drawings.
Private contracts often include provisions similar to the Federal
Shop Drawing Clause.19 7 The current edition of the AIA General Con-
ditions includes a detailed provision 98 (the "AIA Shop Drawing
Clause") that assigns responsibility for shop drawing design to the
prime contractor (and derivatively to its subcontractors and suppli-
ers).1 99 Under the AIA General Conditions, the architect will review
and approve shop drawings "but only for the limited purpose of check-
ing for conformance with the information given and the design concept
expressed in the Contract Documents."20 0 The architect's review does
not relieve the contractor of any of its responsibilities or constitute the
architect's approval of the construction activities. 2 01 The architect's
approval of shop drawings does not operate to approve or accept de-
sign changes reflected in the shop drawings unless the contractor ad-
vised the architect in writing of the change and the architect approved
the specific change involved.2 02
When shop drawings lead to disputes, participants in the process
often point accusing fingers at one another and offer conflicting con-
tract interpretations. 2 03 Several cases involve the contractor's respon-
196. 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-21(e)-(f) (2001).
197. See, e.g., Fauss Constr., Inc. v. City of Hooper, 197 Neb. 398, 249 N.W.2d 478
(1977) (involving a provision that may have been based on an earlier version of
the AIA Shop Drawing Clause discussed in the text).
198. AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, 1 3.12.
199. AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, 3.12.5-3.12.6.
200. AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, 4.2.7.
201. AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, 3.12.8, 4.2.7.
202. AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, 3.12.8.
203. See, e.g., Hercules Constr. Co. v. C. J. Moritz Co., 655 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (involving a general contractor who replaced defective supply air fan at
owner's demand and then sued the installation subcontractor, the owner's con-
sulting engineer, the fan manufacturer, and the fan supplier to recover costs of
replacing the fan), overruled on other grounds by Wyrozynski v. Nichols, 752
S.W.2d 433, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (procedural point only); John Grace & Co. v.
State Univ. Constr. Fund, 472 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984), affd as modi-
fied, 475 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1984) (involving a general contractor who sued to col-
lect repair costs from owner, who impleaded general contractor's engineer, who in
turn impleaded equipment manufacturer whom owner had recommended to engi-
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sibility to the owner to conform the shop drawing design to the more
demanding or costly design criteria specified in the contract docu-
ments, 20 4 the additional costs of a design change introduced by shop
drawings, 2O5 or the costs of corrective design and construction. 20 6 Not
surprisingly, the courts have been reluctant to readjust the parties'
allocation of responsibility if the contract terms are unambiguous. 20 7
Several cases involve claims against those indirectly involved with
the defective shop drawing design. In these cases, the contract terms
may be vague or incomplete. For example, the project A/E may incur
liability to the owner for approving a contractor's or subcontractor's
defective shop drawing design, but probably only if the owner can
neer); Steven M. Siegfried & Stanley P. Sklar, Protecting Subcontractor with Ap-
propriate Contract Clauses, in DESIGN-BUILD CONTRACTING HANDBOOK, supra
note 9, at 323, 332-36.
204. See, e.g., Sun Gold, Inc. & Inland Empire Builders, Inc., 61-1 BCA 2878, 1960
WL 303 (Armed Servs. B.C.A. 1960) (finding that contractor could not satisfy its
contractual responsibility by installing lavatory vents in accordance with shop
drawings that complied with the applicable building code but not with more
stringent design requirements also included in the contract drawings).
205. See, e.g., Elec. & Missile Facilities, Inc., 65-2 BCA % 5122, 1965 WL 776 (Armed
Servs. B.C.A. 1965) (finding that government was liable for costs incurred to sub-
stitute materials because the contract specifications were ambiguous and the con-
tracting officer initially approved a shop drawing adopting one interpretation).
206. See, e.g., Limbach Co., 75-1 BCA %1 1,258, 1975 WL 1379 (Gen. Servs. Adm.
B.C.A. 1975) (finding that subcontractor was not entitled to additional compensa-
tion for the cost of changing the location of piping to conform to the contract re-
quirements after completing installation in accordance with the shop drawings).
207. See Aleutian Constructors v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 372 (1991) (holding a gov-
ernment contractor was not allowed to recover costs of correcting defective roof-
ing design even though the government provided relatively detailed design
specifications for the roof and the contracting officer approved the design details
proposed by the contractor's shop drawings). A plethora of cases have rejected
the argument that one party authorized or implicitly accepted a design change
merely because that party or its design representative knew of, or even expressly
approved, the design details illustrated in a shop drawing. See, e.g., Petrocelli
Elec. Co. v. Crow Constr. Co., 1999 WL 791683 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding that
prime contractor's approval of subcontractor's shop drawings did not relieve the
subcontractor of responsibility for all work required by the contract documents);
Fauss Constr., Inc. v. City of Hooper, 197 Neb. 398, 249 N.W.2d 478 (1977) (hold-
ing that approval by owner's architect of shop drawing providing for one material
did not operate to modify the requirement of the contract documents calling for
different material); D.C. McClain, Inc. v. Arlington County, 452 S.E.2d 659 (Va.
1995) (finding an owner did not authorize a change by approving a shop drawing
not conforming to the contract documents); Alexander v. Gerald E. Morrissey,
Inc., 399 A.2d 503 (Vt. 1979) (concluding that approval by owner's architect of a
design deviation shown in prime contractor's submittal did not bind the owner).
See generally Managing the Submittal Process, Part II, CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS
MONTHLY, May 2000, at 1 (summarizing several federal and state cases). For an
extensive collection of federal contract opinions applying the Federal Shop Draw-
ing Clause, see Paul D'Aloisio, The Design Responsibility and Liability of Govern-
ment Contracts, 22 PuB. CONT. L.J. 515 (1993).
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show that the project A/E was professionally negligent in doing so.2 08
The controlling principle is that the approving design professional is
subject to the normal professional duty of care for whatever profes-
sional services he or she renders in connection with the process. So
long as a design professional serves any role in the shop drawing pro-
cess, the potential for professional liability is inherent. "Submittal re-
view is one of the most sensitive activities performed by the
architect."209
A Texas case illustrates how the uncertain division of labor inevi-
tably created by shop drawing practices may leave both the project
A/E and the prime contractor vulnerable for design defects attributa-
ble to a subcontractor's design. In Great American Insurance Co. v.
North Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1,210 the Texas Supreme
Court upheld the liability of the prime contractor for an inadequate
design where the plans and specifications furnished by the owner to
the prime contractor failed to address the particular design detail and
a subcontractor provided, and the owner's engineer approved, a shop
drawing detailing the inadequate design. According to the opinion of
the Texas Court of Appeals, 2 1 1 the trial court had entered judgment
against the general contractor as well as the engineer and the subcon-
tractor even though the jury had found that the engineer's negligence
proximately caused the structural defect in question. In affirming the
trial court's judgment against the general contractor, the court of ap-
peals held that there may be more than one proximate cause.2 12
Cases involving death or personal injury represent a special cate-
gory in which courts may apply heightened scrutiny to the role of any
licensed design professional in the shop drawing process. The Kansas
City Hyatt Regency Hotel skywalk collapse in 1981 tragically focused
attention on the arcane shop drawing process. Approximately one
year after completion of the hotel, two walkways in the hotel lobby
collapsed during a Friday afternoon tea dance attended by over fifteen
hundred people. One hundred fourteen people died, and an additional
one hundred eighty-six were injured. The primary reported court de-
208. Compare John Grace & Co. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 475 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1984), affirm'g as modified 472 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (finding a
project engineer not liable for approving shop drawings where the defects were
not apparent on the face of the drawings), with Alexander, 399 A.2d 503 (finding
a project architect responsible for approving substitution of inferior material pro-
posed by prime contractor).
209. JUSTIN SWEET & JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CON-
TRACTS § 5.17 (3d ed. 1996).
210. 908 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1995).
211. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. N. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1, 902 S.W.2d 488 (Tx. Ct.
App. 1993), rev'd in part, 908 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1995) (affirming the Court of Ap-
peals with respect to the design liability issues, but reversing as to matters of
surety law).
212. Great Am. Ins. Co., 902 S.W.2d at 495.
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cision concerning this colossal disaster arose out of disciplinary ac-
tions against the structural engineers. 213
Expert analysis concluded that the walkways failed due to a design
defect in a critical steel connection in the system of rods from which
the walkways were suspended from the lobby ceiling.2 14 The steel
fabricator proposed the fatal detail in shop drawings, and the struc-
tural engineers retained by the owner's project architect approved
those drawings. 2 15 Evidence showed that the steel fabricator em-
ployed its own engineers who were qualified to design the connections
and that the shop drawing process calling for the steel fabricator to
design steel connections was consistent with prevailing industry prac-
tices.2 1 6 The structural engineers argued that they properly provided
structural drawings that left the connection design to the fabricator.
Although the engineers approved the shop drawings, they claimed
that they did so only for aesthetic purposes, and they denied any duty
to verify the structural integrity of the fabricator's design. Conse-
quently, the engineers argued that their reliance on the fabricator's
shop drawing design was not negligent.
Based on the duty imposed on the structural engineers under the
licensing statutes, 2 17 the court disagreed and held that:
Design of connections is, on the facts of this record, a matter requiring engi-
neering expertise. The statute imposes on the project engineer the responsi-
bility for the design of such connections whether he in fact designs them
himself or not .... [I]t is inconceivable that the legislature contemplated re-
lieving certified engineers of responsibility for engineering decisions made by
non-certified engineers or laymen. Design of connections is, under the stat-
ute, a matter for which the engineer is responsible. Custom, practice, or "bot-
tom line" necessity cannot alter that responsibility.
2 18
Although the Duncan case arose in the context of a disciplinary action
against the engineers, the case should serve as an important prece-
dent in many disputes involving shared design responsibility. As the
Missouri Court of Appeals' opinion reflects, an analysis of the legal
responsibility of a design professional who participates in a shared de-
sign process begins by examining the contractual source and scope of
the design professional's duty, but it does not end there. Licensing
213. Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Profl Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming revocation of the engineering licenses of two engi-
neers and the engineering firm that employed them; the civil damage claims were
settled).
214. Id. at 540.
215. Id. at 529-30.
216. Id.
217. The principle statute in effect at the time, Mo. REV. STAT. § 327.411 (1978)
(amended 1999), imposed project-wide responsibility on any engineer who affixed
his or her professional seal to plans for an engineering project. See text accompa-
nying infra notes 269-71 for a summary of the pertinent provisions of this statute
in its current form, Mo. REV. STAT. § 327.411 (2001).
218. Duncan, 744 S.W.2d at 537.
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statutes and public policy considerations may impose duties on the
design professional beyond any contractual understandings and with-
out regard to customs and practices in the industry. This principle is
especially compelling when personal injury or public safety is in-
volved. The Duncan court held that "the level of care required of a
professional engineer is directly proportional to the potential for harm
arising from his design . ."219
Other personal injury cases illustrate that shared design responsi-
bility may blur the boundaries of liability. In Jaeger v. Henningson,
Durham & Richardson, Inc. ,220 an architect who failed to recognize
that a shop drawing of a stairway and landing called for lighter gauge
steel than the construction drawings specified was held liable to a
worker who was injured when the landing collapsed. By contrast, in
Waggoner v. W&W Steel Co.,221 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held
that a project architect's liability for injuries attributable to a shop
drawing error was limited by the architect's contractual scope of re-
sponsibility. The plaintiff, a worker injured when a steel framework
fell, sued the project owner, the steel fabricator, and the project archi-
tect. The plaintiff claimed that shop drawings submitted to the prime
contractor and approved by the architect should have provided for
temporary bracing. The court of appeals reversed a directed verdict
for the architect entered on the basis that the architect "undertook to
supervise the construction project."222 The supreme court, however,
held that under the contract, which was consistent with the AIA Shop
Drawing Clause, the architect had no duty to assure the safety of the
steel framework design. Accordingly, the supreme court reinstated
the directed verdict.2 23
The shop drawing cases show that shared design responsibility
both obscures traditional roles and complicates liability analysis.
Contractual provisions similar to the Federal Shop Drawing Clause or
the AIA Shop Drawing Clause may adequately allocate responsibility
for many common situations, but not for all. Especially in cases of
personal injury or damage to innocent third parties, the courts may
impose on the project A/E a greater responsibility than the contract
documents reflect based on the notion that "the level of care required
... is directly proportional to the potential for harm arising from" the
services of a design professional. 2 24 In all events, each design profes-
sional who assumes a role in the process will be liable for failure to
219. Id. at 540.
220. 714 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1983).
221. 657 P.2d 147 (Okla. 1982).
222. Id. at 149 (quoting from the opinion of the court of appeals).
223. Id. at 151.
224. Duncan, 744 S.W.2d at 540.
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perform that specific role in accordance with the professional standard
of care.
IV. SHARED AND DELEGATED DESIGNS-THE NEW
DESIGN-BUILD WORLD
A. Evolution of Specialty Design-Build
As the shop drawing discussion demonstrates, specialty subcon-
tractors, manufacturers, and suppliers have long provided some of the
detailed design peculiar to their trades or products even when a pro-
ject architect or project engineer nominally furnishes the complete de-
sign for the project. There are also other common examples of divided
design responsibility in a design-bid-build project. For example, ma-
terial and equipment manufacturers and suppliers often design major
components called for in the project plans and specifications.225 Al-
though these instances of shared design responsibility are significant,
they do not involve the wholesale reallocation of design responsibility
for a project component from the owner's design team to the construc-
tion team. Specialty design-build purports to do exactly that.
Current industry literature, as well as changes to common indus-
try contract forms, reflect the distinct shift in the industry to a greater
division of design responsibility among several participants in the con-
struction process. 2 26 What accounts for this trend? Developments af-
fecting design and construction contracting practices often evolve in
response to technical developments in the industry and the omnipres-
ent demand for greater control over project costs and schedules.
These considerations encouraged the well-documented movement to-
ward the design-build and construction management project delivery
systems. 22 7 They also explain the increasing use of specialty
design-build.
One industry commentator has noted that the traditional de-
sign-bid-build system, while conservative in its approach toward de-
225. See, e.g., Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding non-engineer employees of steel truss manufacturer designed trusses
under a contract with the prime contractor, and consulting engineer retained by
manufacturer negligently approved the manufacturer's defective design).
226. Friedlander, Liability, supra note 8 (noting that a specialty subcontractor, rather
than the project architect or the architect's engineering consultant, often provides
the construction drawings for the entire heating, ventilating, and air conditioning
system for a project and that the steel fabricator, rather than the structural engi-
neer for the project, may design the structural steel connections); see also Iris D.
Tommelein & Glenn Ballard, Coordinating Specialists, J. CONSTRUCTION ENGI-
NEERING & MGMT, April 1998, at 1 (noting that a subcontractor's first involve-
ment with a project may be completion of specialty design).
227. See SWEET, supra note 6, §§ 17.04(D)-(F); Milton F. Lunch, Liability Concerns
Reshaping Legal Environment, BUILDING DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Oct. 1990;
Meyers & Albers, supra note 13, at 7.
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sign, is flawed in part because it "relies on the premise that the most
advanced construction technology and knowledge of the most practical
construction methods lie with architects and engineers. In fact, today,
that knowledge lies more with specialty contractors and building prod-
uct manufacturers." 2 28 Another commentator has observed that the
owner's design professional "does not hold a monopoly on all design
knowledge necessary to complete a successful, modern construction
project, and it is often prudent for him or her to rely upon the exper-
tise of an experienced contractor or supplier to design certain compo-
nents of the required work."2 2 9 For the sake of efficiency, the process
of allocating greater design responsibility to specialty trades is now
commonplace for some trades, and the practice is gaining prevalence
in others.230
Another telling indication of the increased industry attention to
specialty design-build emerged in the 1997 edition of the American
Institute of Architects' bellwether General Conditions.231 The AIA
General Conditions apply expressly to projects using the traditional
design-bid-build project delivery system in which the contractor
builds in accordance with a design furnished by the owner's project
architect. As noted in section III.G, for many years, the AIA General
Conditions have addressed the subject of shop drawings. The 1997
version of the AIA General Conditions, however, is far more explicit in
dealing with the trend toward allocation of design responsibility to
specialty trades. 23 2 One construction industry source describes the
AIA's approach to the division of design responsibility in the 1997 edi-
tion of the AlA General Conditions as controversial, even while con-
ceding that it arguably reflects established practices in the
industry.233
The few reported cases that involve specialty design-build high-
light some important legal implications of the practice. Chief among
these are the complex legal relationships that often result and the po-
tential that specialty design-build has to embroil multiple parties in
design liability disputes.
A case involving serious injury to a construction worker illustrates
the potential for multiple and competing assertions of blame when-
ever design responsibility is divided among two or more participants
228. Hinchey, supra note 9, at 46.
229. Nancy R. Potter, Design Delegation Provisions of AIA Document A201, 1997 Edi-
tion, CONSTRUCTION LAW, July 1998, at 27.
230. Friedlander, Legal Concerns, supra note 8.
231. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
232. See Potter, supra note 229. The text accompanying infra notes 256-57 discusses
the relevant clause in the AIA General Conditions.
233. Milton F. Lunch, Revised A201 Leaves Many Design Delegation Issues Unclear,
BUILDING DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Dec. 1997, at 29.
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in the design and construction process. 234 The project design called
for precast concrete panel connections to be welded onto the outside of
a building. A construction worker fell from a ladder while preparing
to perform the task. The injured worker's wife sued a long list of de-
fendants who played overlapping roles relating to the design and in-
stallation of the precast panels. The court's analysis of the negligence
claims 2 35 against the distinct defendants provides an instructive cata-
logue of potential theories inherent in the specialty design-build
process.
The plaintiff claimed that both the owner's project architect and
the engineer retained by the architect failed to adhere to the profes-
sional standard of care in supervising, coordinating, and inspecting
the work.2 3 6 The court affirmed summary judgments in favor of the
architect and the engineer because the "contract documents uniformly
and clearly limit [the architect's] responsibility to design and determi-
nation as to design conformance, and do not extend to worker
safety."23 7
With that important distinction in mind, the court's reversal of
summary judgment for the prime contractor is not surprising. Under
the contract documents, the prime contractor was responsible "to initi-
ate, maintain and supervise safety precautions and programs; take
reasonable precautions for the safety of workers and to provide all rea-
sonable protection to prevent damage, injury and loss to employees on
the work. .. and to erect and maintain.. . all reasonable safeguards
for safety."238 The court held that the record supported the negligence
claim against the prime contractor on the grounds, among others, that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prime
contractor failed to provide a safe working environment by failing to
require the precast subcontractor to submit a required erection proce-
dure.2 39 Although erection procedures directly involve a prime con-
tractor's customary responsibility for construction means, methods,
and procedures, the specification of an erection procedure is also ar-
guably an engineering service. Thus, one can read the court's opinion
as recognizing that, although the owner's contract with the prime con-
tractor was not a design-build contract in the normal sense, the prime
contractor had some responsibility for those design functions included
in the scope of the design-build subcontract between the prime con-
tractor and the precast subcontractor. This conclusion is consistent
234. Block v. Lohan Assoc., Inc. 645 N.E.2d 207 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
235. The plaintiff also sued certain defendants under an Illinois statute, but those
claims are beyond the scope of this Article.
236. Block, 645 N.E.2d at 222-24.
237. Id. at 222.
238. Id. at 214.
239. Id.
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with concept that a subcontractor's scope of work must logically be a
subset of the prime contractor's.
The court also held that the plaintiff raised genuine issues of mate-
rial fact as to the negligence of the precast subcontractor, which had
direct contractual responsibility for the design, fabrication, and erec-
tion of the precast concrete. The plaintiffs experts testified that be-
cause an erection plan was required, the precast subcontractor was
responsible for either preparing the plan or seeing to its preparation.
The record before the court supported an inference that the appropri-
ate process for devising an erection plan required coordinated partici-
pation by at least two key participants.
The experts agreed that the plan of erection chosen at the job site was unsafe
but that a plan of erection should be the product of discussions between the
precaster and the erector, with the precaster usually devising the plan since it
is in the best position to interpret the architect's specifications.
2 4 0
That evidence underscores the unique interdependence of roles that
often characterizes specialty design-build. In the first place, the ex-
pert opinions provided direct evidence that the erection plan could
only result from the cooperation of at least two specialty trades. Addi-
tionally, as evidenced by the court's holding with regard to the prime
contractor, in this instance the prime contractor also had indirect, but
critical, responsibility for the erection plan.
The testimony regarding the process for developing the erection
plan also highlights another basis upon which the project architect
could have been subject to liability. The experts noted that develop-
ment of the erection plan required someone to interpret the architect's
specifications. In an appropriate case involving a situation such as
this, a plaintiff might adduce evidence to show that the project archi-
tect negligently provided unclear or otherwise insufficient plans. This
is merely to note once again that specialty design-build, in moving
comprehensive design responsibility away from the project A/E, does
not necessarily relieve the project A/E from all potential liability relat-
ing to the specialty design.
Also instructive is the plaintiffs argument seeking reversal of sum-
mary judgment for the precast concrete subcontractor's engineering
consultant who designed the precast panels. One can infer from the
opinion that the plaintiff conceded that the consultant's contract ex-
pressly excluded any responsibility for participating in the erection
plan or procedures. Instead, the plaintiff argued that because the en-
gineering consultant had overall responsibility for the precast design,
the consultant necessarily bore the responsibility "to determine the
method of temporary bracing of the precast ... because that determi-
nation requires an engineering judgment based upon the designer's
knowledge of the forces that must be tolerated in erecting the precast.
240. Id. at 220.
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Plaintiff argues that ... bracing is fundamental to responsibility for
the structural integrity of the precast panels."2 4 1 The court rejected
this argument solely on the basis that the consultant's contract did not
require the consultant to participate in the construction in any
way.242
The court added an emphatic statement that suggests the ques-
tionable conclusion that circumstances can never impose a duty on a
design professional that goes beyond the scope of services specified in
the professional services contract. "The limited responsibilities of [the
consultant] cannot be enlarged by the avalanche of expert testimony
on collateral issues to impose a duty upon [the consultant]."243 This
conclusion may be too broad. The court neither rejected nor accepted
the plaintiffs position that the determination regarding temporary
bracing required an engineering judgment. The opinion does not dis-
close whether those who made the determination in this case were
qualified, licensed engineers. Arguably, if the determination required
professional engineering services, then some professional involved in
issuance of the relevant design documents, whether the precast engi-
neer or the project architect, should have required an appropriate sub-
mission to be prepared, signed, and sealed by a qualified design
professional. 244
A case involving the highly specialized expertise required for a
planetarium project illustrates the potential risks that shared design
practices hold for a project A/E.245 The Cleveland City School District
hired an architectural and engineering firm (URS) to design a school
that included a planetarium. Because of the unique nature of planeta-
rium dome design, URS disclaimed the ability to provide the dome de-
sign, but it was involved extensively in selecting Dow Chemical
Company to design and build the dome, and URS also helped obtain
building department approval for the dome design. 24 6 Following the
initial design process, URS served as project manager for the entire
project but Dow operated under a subcontract with the prime contrac-
tor for the project. The school district sued both Dow and URS for
defects in the dome. Although the primary issues on appeal involved
only whether URS's cross-claims against Dow were barred by the ap-
241. Id. at 221.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. The court also reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the company that provided and operated the crane hoisting equipment involved
in the accident. That ruling, however, involved only allegations of negligent con-
struction activity and not anything relating to design or other professional ser-
vices. Id. at 221-22.
245. Bd. of Educ. v. URS Co., No. 64496, 1994 WL 520862 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22,
1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 648 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio 1995).
246. Id. at *1-2.
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plicable statutes of limitation or repose, the underlying claims of the
school district illustrate that any significant involvement by a project
A/E in the specialty design process may expose the project A/E to
liability.
A case arising out of defects in a refrigeration system for an under-
ground cold storage facility applied fundamental design liability prin-
ciples to design defect claims against multiple parties involved in
specialty design.24 7 The owner sued several parties when the over-
head support for the refrigeration system failed. The defendants in-
cluded the prime contractor responsible for the overall project to
convert an underground area into a cold storage facility, the refrigera-
tion subcontractor hired by the prime contractor to design and install
the refrigeration system, and the company that the refrigeration sub-
contractor in turn hired to install the system. The court of appeals
affirmed a directed verdict for the prime contractor because the evi-
dence failed to establish that the prime contractor "ever undertook to
design, manufacture or supply" the defective support brackets. 248
This court, however, reversed directed verdicts in favor of the refriger-
ation system subcontractor and the installation firm on the basis of
substantial evidence that each had contractual responsibility for both
the design and the construction of the refrigeration system.24 9 The
court acknowledged that the contract between the refrigeration com-
pany and the installer did not specifically provide for the installation
firm to design, manufacture, and install the brackets, but the court
concluded that the evidence on the record was sufficient to allow the
jury to conclude that both firms in fact participated in these functions.
The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to have its case against
these defendants go to the jury on a product liability theory,2 50 as well
as on a negligent design theory. 2 51
Although specialty design-build practices have yet to produce
many reported decisions, these cases show that any shared design pro-
cess may blur conventional liability boundaries. Even in the relatively
rare instance in which the circumstances or the contracts clearly de-
lineate the distinct responsibilities relating to the specialty work, it
may be difficult to categorize each step in the process as exclusively
247. Commercial Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985).
248. Id. at 667.
249. Id. at 667-68.
250. Id. at 669-71.
251. Id. at 670-71. The court held that under Missouri law, the absence of privity
between the plaintiff and the defendants did not bar recovery based on negligence
because, under the evidence, the jury could find that the failure of the brackets
due to the negligent design was foreseeable to the defendants. Id.
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within one scope or the other.25 2 Often, the project A/E, the prime
contractor, and the specialty designer (and perhaps others) will have
overlapping responsibility for interdependent aspects of the process by
which the specialty design is developed, approved, coordinated, and
integrated into the project. All of these factors will tend to distribute
to several participants some risk of liability associated with specialty
design.
B. Industry Perspectives on Specialty Design
Within the construction industry, the increasing use of specialty
design-build has raised some controversy. An editorial in an engi-
neering periodical addresses the propriety of shifting design responsi-
bility from the owner's design team to the prime contractor and its
subcontractors.
Design firms in control of projects obviously should not be allowed to force
contractors and other non-design firms to assume responsibility for design
work that is not properly their own or to curtail professional liability expo-
sure. But those firms should be able to voluntarily perform design work col-
lateral to their construction or supply activities under the careful supervision
of licensed professionals. The objective is to keep design details from falling
through the cracks in the construction process and causing unsafe conditions.
That should not keep qualified firms from participating in design
activities. 2 5
3
In a New York case, a trade association for contractors challenged the
legitimacy of a licensing regulation that expressly permitted a project
A/E to arrange for specialty design to be provided through a prime
contractor and its subcontractors. 2 5 4 The case reveals a bitter split
within some factions of the construction industry on the merits of spe-
cialty design-build. The court quoted the argument from the contrac-
tors association's brief that the regulation permitting a practice akin
to specialty design-build improperly authorized design professionals
to "utilize contractors and subcontractors, often against their wishes,
as integral participants in the performance of professional design
work that they are neither licensed nor qualified to perform."2 55
At the opposite extreme from the position taken by the New York
contractors association is subparagraph 3.12.10 of the AIA General
Conditions, which endorses the specialty design-build process. This
252. Cf. Hickman v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., No. 99-1959, 2000 WL
635426 (E.D. La. May 17, 2000) (involving a painting contractor who unsuccess-
fully argued that a decision whether or not to add abrasive material to curb paint
was a matter of design specifications for which the contractor was not
responsible).
253. Editorial, ENGINEERING NEwS-REC., Sept. 30, 1991, at 110.
254. Gen. Bldg. Contractors of N.Y. State, Inc. v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 670 N.Y.S.2d
697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
255. Id. at 698 (citation omitted). For a further discussion of the regulation, see text
accompanying infra notes 287-300.
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provision was introduced as a new concept in the 1997 edition of that
influential industry form, and it constitutes an unmistakable harbin-
ger of the importance of specialty design-build in the current industry
environment. This provision (the "AIA Allocation Clause") establishes
a procedure by which the owner and its project architect can require
the prime contractor to provide professional design services "for a por-
tion of the work."
If professional design services or certifications by a design professional related
to systems, materials or equipment are specifically required of the Contractor
by the Contract Documents, the Owner and the Architect will specify all per-
formance and design criteria that such services must satisfy. The Contractor
shall cause such services or certifications to be provided by a properly licensed
design professional, whose signature and seal shall appear on all drawings,
calculations, specifications, certifications, Shop Drawings and other submit-
tals prepared by such professional. Shop Drawings and other submittals re-
lated to the Work designed or certified by such professional, if prepared by
others, shall bear such professional's written approval when submitted to the
Architect. The Owner and the Architect shall be entitled to rely upon the ade-
quacy, accuracy and completeness of the services, certifications or approvals
performed by such design professionals, provided the Owner and Architect
have specified to the Contractor all performance and design criteria that such
services must satisfy. Pursuant to this Subparagraph 3.12.10, the Architect
will review, approve or take other appropriate action on submittals only for
the limited purpose of checking for conformance with information given and
the design concept expressed in the Contract Documents. The Contractor
shall not be responsible for the adequacy of the performance or design criteria
required by the Contract Documents.
2 5 6
The AIA Allocation Clause is not a restatement of the long-standing
shop drawing practice, nor is it limited to design services that are inci-
dental to construction activities. It endorses the practically unlimited
division of design responsibility between the design team and the con-
struction team, provided that the contractor's design responsibility
only encompasses a portion of the work.
The ALA Allocation Clause includes several important components
that warrant careful attention. First, note that the clause assigns to
the owner and the project architect the responsibility to "specify all
performance and design criteria that such services must satisfy." Ex-
cept in a situation in which the owner itself has design expertise, this
must contemplate that the project architect will establish and commu-
nicate to the prime contractor whatever performance and design crite-
ria apply to the specialty design services. As a result, the project
architect will have a duty to provide that information consistent with
the professional standard of care that applies to all other design ser-
256. AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, 3.12.10. Although this provision
mainly concerns design services required of the prime contractor, it also governs
design certifications the contractor must provide. When the contract documents
include performance specifications, it is common to require certifications by de-
sign professionals relating to certain systems, materials, or equipment.
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vices provided by the project architect. One can anticipate that some
disputes will periodically arise with reference to the sufficiency, cor-
rectness, or clarity of the performance and design criteria provided by
the project architect. Indeed, disputes may well arise over the mean-
ing of the undefined but seemingly broad concept of "performance and
design criteria."
Note further that the AIA Allocation Clause requires the contrac-
tor to arrange for all design services through a duly licensed profes-
sional, who must sign and seal all design documentation involved.
Although situations may arise in which the prime contractor's own
personnel directly perform these services, in many cases the prime
contractor will merely serve as an intermediary to arrange for the spe-
cialty design by a subcontractor or supplier to the prime contractor.
Even though under those circumstances the prime contractor, and
perhaps one or more specialty subcontractors, will do little more than
accommodate the design process, the AIA Allocation Clause will result
in the specialty design services being within the prime contractor's
and relevant subcontractor's contractual responsibility. Among other
things, that will raise the prospect that the prime contractor and any
subcontractor involved may have warranty liability for the design ser-
vices they secure from design consultants. 257
Note also that the AIA Allocation Clause provides that the owner
and the architect may rely on the design services furnished through
the general contractor and its subcontractors, provided that the owner
and its architect specify "all performance and design criteria that such
services must satisfy." While these provisions may prove adequate for
many situations in which the owner and its project architect elect spe-
cialty design-build for selected aspects of the project, they will no
doubt produce controversies in other situations. At a minimum, the
project architect will be subject to the accusation that the performance
and design criteria furnished are not adequate or otherwise reflect a
failure to conform to the requisite standard of care. Additionally, the
project architect must still review or approve the contractor's submit-
tals but (consistent with the AIA provisions relating to shop drawings
discussed in section III.G) "only for the limited purpose of checking for
conformance with information given and the design concept ex-
pressed" in the contract documents prepared by the architect. This
provision should be fertile ground for disputes and finger pointing.
The AIA Allocation Clause reflects the emerging industry view
that design responsibility for a traditional design-bid-build project
may be divided among the owner's project design team on the one
hand and any number of specialty trades on the other. This Article
257. This is an anomalous circumstance because the consultant will probably be liable
only to the extent of any professional malpractice. See infra notes 319-20 and
accompanying text.
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accepts without question the proposition that such a division of design
responsibility often will achieve efficiencies that both enhance the
quality of the overall project design and reduce the project cost and
completion time. Under sanctity of contract principles, the owner and
the project A/E normally should be free to determine how best to allo-
cate design responsibility. What this Article questions is how contract
and tort principles should apply when the parties choose specialty
design-build.
C. A Legal Perspective on Shared Design-Delegating
Duties and Allocating Risks
Although industry commentators may speak of delegation when
discussing specialty design-build in general, and the AIA Allocation
Clause in particular, 258 in a legal sense the industry in fact is more
concerned with allocating responsibility and risk than delegating du-
ties. The project A/E can delegate design duties to others only if the
project A/E's contractual duties include the delegated tasks. This is
an important distinction under contract and tort theories. 25 9
The project A/E is contractually liable for performance of delegated
tasks, although not necessarily liable in tort for errors and omissions
in those tasks.2 60 That is, a project A/E should be liable for breach of
contract (as distinguished from professional negligence) if a specialty
designer fails to furnish delegated services as required. For example,
if an architect's contract establishes design standards for the specialty
work that the architect delegates to others 26 1 and the specialty de-
signer fails to meet those standards, the architect may be liable to the
owner as a matter of contract. 26 2 If, by contrast, the architect's con-
tract excludes the specialty design and contemplates that the prime
contractor will retain the specialty designer, the architect should have
no contractual liability for performing the excluded services. Even in
the latter case, however, the architect may be contractually obligated
to provide design criteria for the specialty task or to review the spe-
cialty design. If so, the architect will have a tort duty of professional
care based on the architect's distinct role concerning the specialty
design.
258. See, e.g., SWEET, supra note 6, § 12.08(C); Lunch, supra note 233; Potter, supra
note 229.
259. See supra section III.E.
260. See Commercial Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 667-68
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
261. See, e.g., Follansbee Bros. Co. v. Garrett-Cromwell Eng'g Co., 48 Pa. Super 183
(1911) (involving a contract that specified that commercial furnaces would be de-
signed similarly to furnaces constructed for an earlier project).
262. See generally 5 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 2, § 17:71.
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To take a simple example, a project architect's contract for design
of a warehouse may include only the building design and may leave
specification and procurement of material handling equipment to the
prime contractor. If an equipment design defect causes an injury, the
architect should have no liability because the architect undertook no
duty relating to the equipment. In a construction project involving
multiple design parties working on interrelated project components,
the analysis will seldom be so simple.
In part, the AIA Allocation Clause places specialty design-build
into the proper conceptual context by defining distinct contractual du-
ties for the architect, on the one hand, and the prime contractor and
its subcontractors, on the other. The architect is responsible to define
criteria for the specialty design and to incorporate the design into the
overall project design, while the construction team provides the spe-
cialty design itself. Where the AIA Allocation Clause falls short is in
its failure to recognize the many complications that such an arrange-
ment may involve. The AlA Allocation Clause is a suitable beginning
for structuring the complex relationships created by specialty de-
sign-build, but it is not sufficient for that purpose.
D. Legislative and Regulatory Controls Affecting Specialty
Design-Build
Design professional licensing regimes in each state create the gen-
eral framework for regulating architects and engineers. 2 63 These
statutes and regulations reflect the public interest in building safety.
They generally prohibit the practice of architecture, engineering, and
other design professions except by a person who has the appropriate
academic credentials and state license. They also regulate the design
professions to protect the public from unethical practices and other
professional misconduct.
On public policy grounds, one might argue that a single architect
or engineer "of record" for a project should be responsible for project
safety.26 4 From such a perspective, a state legislature or administra-
tive body might aggressively regulate any practices that either sprin-
kle design responsibility among independent design professionals or
that create the risk that unlicensed personnel might design any signif-
icant components of a project. In general, the widely divergent state
263. See STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO ARCHITECT, ENGINEER, AND CONTRACTOR LICENS-
ING (Stephen G. Walker et al. eds., 1999); A STATE-BY STATE GUIDE TO CONSTRUC-
TION AND DESIGN LAW: CURRENT STATUTES AND PRACTICES (Carl J. Circo &
Christopher H. Little eds., 1998).
264. Cf Stipanowich, supra note 6 (arguing for greater codification and uniformity in
construction law generally, including the possible adoption of a uniform construc-
tion law code); Turner, supra note 160 (arguing, among other things, for con-
sumer protection regulation over residential construction).
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licensing and regulatory schemes have not taken such a sweeping
approach.
Because specialty design-build has only begun to attract attention,
it is not surprising that only a relatively small number of jurisdictions
appear to regulate the practice in any significant or direct manner.
The concluding section of this Part considers legislative and regula-
tory provisions in four states that have either a direct or indirect effect
on specialty design-build. 26 5 These jurisdictions represent four dis-
tinct regulatory perspectives. In the first two jurisdictions, Massachu-
setts and Missouri, the impact is indirect, and it is largely an
inadvertent side effect of each state's general licensing regime. Regu-
latory agencies in the other two states, Florida and New York, have
adopted regulations that more directly govern specialty design-build,
perhaps recognizing that the practice creates significant policy
concerns.
1. Indirect Authority for Specialty Design-Build-Massachusetts
and Missouri
a. Massachusetts
Massachusetts tacitly allows unregulated specialty design-build
practices. As is true for most states, Massachusetts prohibits the
practice of architecture and engineering by those not holding the ap-
propriate license issued by the state. 266 The Massachusetts legisla-
tion, however, allows unlicensed persons to perform certain
architectural and engineering services. No engineering license is re-
quired in connection with "the preparation of plans, specifications or
shop drawings by any person, firm or partnership, corporation or asso-
ciation practicing any such trade, for work to be installed or being in-
stalled by the same person, firm, partnership, corporation or
association preparing such plans, specifications or shop drawings."26 7
At a minimum, this exception permits unlicensed specialty trades
to furnish design details typical of the shop drawing process. What is
more significant is that this exemption also seems to permit a trade
subcontractor, even one that employs no licensed engineers, to furnish
265. Although this Article makes no attempt to catalogue statutes and regulations in
other states that have a potential impact on specialty design-build, it is certain
that many states recognize licensing exemptions and include other licensing pro-
visions that bear indirectly on specialty design-build, but it does not appear that
many have adopted provisions as germane to the topic as are the Florida and
New York regulations discussed here. See generally STATE-BY-STATE GuIDE TO
ARCHITECT, ENGINEER, AND CONTRACTOR LICENSING, supra note 263.
266. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, §§ 60(A)-60(M) (2003) (architecture); id.
§§ 81(D)-81(R) (engineering).
267. Id. § 81(R)(a). A similar exception exists with respect to architectural services.
Id. § 60(L)(3).
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the entire design for those components of the project that the trade
contractor will install. Presumably, the statutory exemption autho-
rizes unlicensed personnel to design significant aspects of a project.
For example, if the owner and the project A/E decide to leave substan-
tially all of the mechanical design to the mechanical subcontractor,
then Massachusetts law seems to allow all of the mechanical engineer-
ing work to be performed by employees of the subcontractor even if
none of those employees hold engineering degrees or licenses.2 68
b. Missouri
A Missouri statute also indirectly authorizes the specialty de-
sign-build process. Missouri law requires that every architect, profes-
sional engineer, and professional land surveyor affix his or her seal to
all final plans and other design documents prepared by him or her, or
under his or her immediate personal supervision. 26 9 The architect or
engineer is "personally responsible for the contents of all such docu-
ments sealed by such licensee."2 70 This statute, however, does not re-
quire that a project A/E accept project-wide design responsibility
merely because he or she is the primary or sole design professional
acting for the owner. The statute allows the project architect or engi-
neer to circumscribe his or her design responsibility by the simple ex-
pedient of adding an exculpatory legend to his or her plans
"disclaiming any responsibility for all other plans, specifications, esti-
mates, reports, or other documents or instruments relating to or in-
tended to be used for any part or parts of the architectural or
engineering project or survey."2 7 1
The Missouri statute seems to permit a project A/E to disclaim
completely professional responsibility for designated components of
the project. This result comports well with specialty design-build
practices in which the project A/E's scope of services expressly ex-
cludes the design of certain aspects of the project left to trade subcon-
tractors. Especially when construction documents are included in a
bid package or a comprehensive project manual, the Missouri statute
provides a simple procedure by which a design professional can un-
equivocally disclaim professional responsibility for design documents
prepared by others that may relate to the design professional's ser-
vices and duties. While this statute is not directed at specialty de-
268. See Jo-Ann M. Marzullo, Design Delegation and Various Design-Build Hybrids
Now Used for Construction Projects (Apr. 26, 2001) (unpublished paper presented
at the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
2001 Annual Spring Symposia, on file with the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW).
269. Mo. REV. STAT. § 327.411.1 (2001).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 327.411.3.
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sign-build, it should provide significant protection to a project A/E
whose scope of services excludes a specialty design.
The statute does not state whether the effect of the disclaimer is to
relieve the design professional from all liability associated with the
design documents disclaimed. Presumably, the courts will still look to
the terms of the relevant design contracts to determine whether and
to what extent a design professional has contractually undertaken
some duty relating to design services covered by a disclaimer. For ex-
ample, a project A/E who disclaims responsibility for specialty design
documents may still have liability arising under a contractual duty to
review the disclaimed design documents for conformance with the per-
formance and design criteria furnished by the project A/E.272
The Massachusetts and Missouri statutes reflect the mostly uncon-
troversial proposition that a private contract may define a design pro-
fessional's responsibility for a project. The Massachusetts statute not
only allows the owner and the project A/E to assign certain design
functions to specialty trades, but it even permits a limited category of
unlicensed persons to perform specialty design services. The Missouri
statute merely requires that if a design professional wishes to avoid
liability for certain design activities he or she must make a formal
record for that purpose.
2. Direct Authority for Delegating Design Responsibility-
Florida and New York
At least two states have adopted regulations more immediately
pertinent to specialty design-build practices. In one case (New York),
the regulation reacts directly to industry attitudes and concerns at-
tributable to the rising popularity of design by specialty trades.
a. Florida
Although Florida has not targeted specialty design-build specifi-
cally, it has adopted a broad regulatory framework that governs pro-
fessional responsibility in situations in which multiple engineers
share related design functions. 2 73 These regulations contemplate dis-
tinct roles for the owner's "prime professional" and for engineers "of
record" and any "delegated engineer." The prime professional is the
engineer "who is engaged by the client to provide any planning, de-
sign, coordination, arrangement and permitting for the project and for
construction observations in connection with any engineering project,
service or creative work."2 74 An engineer of record is the engineer
"who is in responsible charge for the preparation, signing, dating,
272. See AIA GENERAL CONDITIONS, supra note 194, §§ 3.12.10, 4.2.7.
273. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61G15-30 to r. 61G15-34 (2003).
274. Id. r. 61G15-30.002(2).
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sealing and issuing of any engineering document(s) for any engineer-
ing service or creative work."275 A delegated engineer is an engineer
"who undertakes a specialty service and provides services or creative
work (delegated engineering document) regarding a portion of the en-
gineering project."276 A delegated engineer, in turn, "is the engineer
of record for that portion of the engineering project."2 77 Specific stan-
dards establish the delegated engineer's responsibility for the dele-
gated services. 278
The Florida regulations implicitly recognize that the owner's pro-
ject engineer (called the prime professional engineer) may or may not
have direct, primary responsibility as the engineer of record for partic-
ular engineering documents. 2 79 The regulations impose limited re-
sponsibility on a prime professional engineer who is not the engineer
of record for specific engineering documents. "It is the responsibility
of the prime professional engineer to retain and coordinate the ser-
vices of such other professionals as needed to complete the services
contracted for the project."280 In connection with recognized catego-
ries of engineering, such as structural engineering, mechanical engi-
neering, and electrical engineering, the regulations include specific
rules governing the responsibilities of both the engineer of record and
any delegated engineer.2 8 1 In this manner, the Florida regulations
both permit and regulate the division of engineering functions among
several engineers.
The Florida regulations reflect an assumption, presumably based
on public policy considerations, 28 2 that an engineer of record (but not
necessarily the owner's prime professional engineer) should ordinarily
retain significant professional responsibility for a particular category
of engineering (such as the structural engineering) even when the con-
tract documents provide that another engineer will have primary re-
sponsibility for a specialty aspect of that category. It is not clear,
275. Id. r. 61G15-30.002(1).
276. Id. r. 61G15-30.002(3).
277. Id.
278. Id. r. 61G15-30.006.
279. Id. r. 61G15-30.002(2) (prime professional engineer may be an engineer of record
for the project).
280. Id. r. 61G15-30.007.
281. See, e.g., id. r. 61G15-31.001 (general responsibility of engineer of record for a
structure); id. r. 61G15-31.007 (design of pre-engineered structures); id. r. 61G15-
31.008 (design of foundations); id. r. 61G15-31.009 (design of structural steel sys-
tems); id. r. 61G15-32.001 (general responsibility rules for fire protection engi-
neering); id. r. 61G15-33.001 (general responsibility rules for electrical systems);
id. r. 61G15-34.001 (general responsibility rules for mechanical systems).
282. The general purpose of the department's responsibility rules common to all engi-
neers is "to safeguard the life, health, property and welfare of the public by pro-
moting proper conduct in the practice of engineering and due care and regard for
acceptable engineering principles and standards." Id. r. 61G15-30.001.
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however, that the regulations necessarily mandate that result if the
participants decide, for sound reasons, to allocate design responsibil-
ity in some other way that does not place a single engineer of record in
charge of all aspects of the engineering documents for the engineering
category in question. 28 3
A key section of the regulations establishes standards that govern
whenever an engineer of record delegates design responsibility to a
specialty engineer.2 84
Request for and Review of Delegated Engineering Documents.
(1) An engineer of record who delegates a portion of his responsibility to a
delegated engineer is obligated to communicate in writing his engineering re-
quirements to the delegated engineer.
(2) An engineer of record who delegates a portion of his design responsibility
to a delegated engineer shall require submission of delegated engineering doc-
uments prepared by the delegated engineer and shall review those documents
for compliance with his written engineering requirements and to confirm the
following:
(a) That the delegated engineering documents have been prepared by an
engineer.
(b) That the delegated engineering documents of the delegated engineer con-
form with the intent of the engineer of record and meet the written criteria.
(c) That the effect of the delegated engineer's work on the overall project gen-
erally conforms with the intent of the engineer of record.
The Florida regulations broadly allow for a division of design responsi-
bility, but they leave unanswered several important questions con-
cerning the professional duties of engineers who share design
responsibility. In the first place, it is not clear to what extent the reg-
ulations restrict the freedom of the participants to allocate design lia-
bility as they deem best by dividing a project into distinct engineering
subprojects. 285 Additionally, the regulations do not clarify what liabil-
283. See id. That regulation explains the purpose of the department's responsibility
rules for engineers and states that the rules "are intended to apply as general
guidelines where no contractual relationship exists between the parties ad-
dressed herein. These rules are not intended to take precedence of contractual
relationships developed between the parties, so long as those contractual rela-
tionships do not violate Chapter 471, F.S., or any other rule promulgated pursu-
ant thereto." Id.
284. Id. r. 61G15-30.005. This regulation is reminiscent of the AIA Allocation Clause
discussed at supra text accompanying notes 256-57, because it requires that the
engineer of record provide to the specialty designer the design intent and written
design criteria and then review the specialty design. The regulation, however,
differs from the AIA Allocation Clause in one important respect. The Florida reg-
ulation allocates responsibility between a specialty engineer and an engineer of
record, but only to the extent that the specialty design is "a portion of' the engi-
neer of record's responsibility. That is, the regulation is concerned only with true
delegation. The ALA Allocation Clause is not concerned with delegation of con-
tractual duties; rather, it allows the participants to divide design duties between
the design team and the prime contractor's team. See supra text accompanying
notes 256-57.
285. See infra note 316.
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ity the engineer of record incurs by reason of having the responsibility
to require and review the delegated engineering documents. Presum-
ably, the engineer of record may be subject to penalties if the dele-
gated engineering documents are not prepared by a qualified
delegated engineer, or if the engineer of record fails to comply with
one of the other requirements applicable to delegated design.
28 6
Would such a violation also be a basis for liability to the project
owner? Finally, it is not clear whether these regulations impose any
non-delegable duties on either the owner's prime professional or an
engineer of record for a specific category of engineering
documentation.
b. New York
New York provides a fascinating example of a regulatory response
targeted specifically at specialty design-build. The regulation takes
the innocuous form of a technical rule designed to guard against un-
professional conduct by licensed architects and engineers. The New
York Board of Regents licenses and regulates design professionals.
2 87
Part of the regulatory scheme addresses unprofessional conduct. 28 8
No current rule directly prohibits specialty design-build or design del-
egation or declares those practices unprofessional. 28 9 Rather, the reg-
ulation declares that participation by a licensee in design delegation
does not constitute unprofessional conduct under the following
circumstances:
(2) participation as a delegator, or delegatee in delegating or accepting dele-
gation, through an intermediate entity not authorized to provide professional
design services, of specifically defined work involving the performance of a
design function requiring a professional license, under the following terms,
conditions and limitations:
(i) such specifically defined design work shall be limited to project compo-
nents ancillary to the main components of the project;
(ii) the delegator shall specify in writing to the delegatee all parameters
which the design must satisfy;
(iii) the design function shall be required to be performed in accordance with
performance specifications established by the delegator;
286. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 61G15-30.005 (2004) (stating that engineers may
avoid disciplinary actions by observing the responsibility rules, although a devia-
tion or departure may be justified by specific circumstances and sound profes-
sional judgment).
287. N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 6506, 7205, 7303 (McKinney 2001).
288. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.3 (2002).
289. As revealed by Gen. Bldg. Contractors of New York State, Inc. v. New York State
Educ. Dep't, 670 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), prior to adoption of the regu-
lation, an administrative interpretation of the then-applicable regulations took
the position that delegation of design through an unlicensed intermediary consti-
tuted unprofessional conduct. See infra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
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(iv) the delegatee shall be required to be licensed or otherwise legally author-
ized to perform the design work involved and shall be required to sign and
certify any design prepared;
(v) the delegator shall be required to review and approve the design submit-
ted by the delegatee for conformance with the established specifications
and parameters and such determination shall be in writing; and
(vi) the delegator shall be required to determine that the design prepared by
the delegatee conforms to the overall project design and can be integrated
into such design and such determination shall be in writing.2 9 0
The definitions of the terms "intermediate entity"29 1 and "dele-
gatee"29 2 make it plain that the Board of Regents adopted the regula-
tion specifically with regard to a common specialty design-build
practice by which the owner's project A/E prepares plans that call for
the prime contractor to arrange the specialty design through a trade
subcontractor. In many respects, the New York regulation is similar
to Florida's regulation governing delegation by an engineer of record.
Both require the delegating professional to specify design require-
ments for the specialty services and to insure that the specialty de-
signer is properly licensed. Further, both require the delegating
professional to review the specialty design for conformance with de-
sign parameters.
However, New York's regulation adds two significant elements not
found in the Florida regulation. First, only design work ancillary to
the main components of the project may be delegated under the regu-
lation. Second, the regulation specifically contemplates that the spe-
cialty work will be delegated through a contractor or subcontractor
performing construction work. These additions show that the New
York regulation has in mind specialty design-build as discussed in
this Article.
The most intriguing insight into the background and purpose of
the New York regulation arises out of a challenge to the rule by trade
groups for general contractors and a specialty trade. In General
Building Contractors of New York State, Inc. v. New York State Educa-
290. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.3(b)(2) (2002).
291. See id. § 29.3(b)(3)(ii) ("Intermediate entity means a person or entity, typically a
contractor or subcontractor, responsible for performing the work under the con-
tract for construction.").
292. See id. § 29.3(b)(3)(iii) ("Delegatee means a design professional, licensed and reg-
istered in accordance with articles 145, 147 or 148 of the Education Law, who is
employed or retained by the intermediate entity to produce design work in com-
pliance with the performance requirements and parameters specified by a dele-
gator."). Although the New York regulation uses language of delegation, it is not
primarily concerned with situations involving true delegation of contractual du-
ties. The regulation operates expressly on the process by which a project A/E
allocates design responsibility to the contractor's team rather than to the owner's
design team. Project A/Es may find that they can avoid the regulation by care-
fully defining the scope of their contractual duties to exclude certain specialty
design services.
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tion Department,2 93 the state contractors' and steel fabricators' as-
sociations in New York challenged the Board of Regents' design
delegation rule. The New York State Society of Professional Engi-
neers, on the other hand, filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
Board's delegation rule. The court's opinion explained that the chal-
lenged rule represented a change from prior administrative determi-
nations that design delegation by an architect or engineer through an
intermediate entity such as a contractor or subcontractor would con-
stitute "unprofessional conduct."294
The contractors' and steel fabricators' associations argued that the
amended rule authorized design professionals to "utilize contractors
and subcontractors, often against their wishes, as integral partici-
pants in the performance of professional design work that they are
neither licensed nor qualified to perform."2 95 The engineers' society
argued to the contrary that the rule was justified, among other rea-
sons, because it "accurately reflects the true nature of the design and
construction environment. 2 96
The opinion revealed that the issue of design delegation had been
the subject of considerable debate before the Department for several
years before the adoption of the new rule. In the years leading up to
the rule change, the Department had initially taken the express posi-
tion that delegation of design through contractors or subcontractors
constituted unprofessional conduct because "it is the responsibility of
the principal design firm to coordinate these efforts and be sure that
the finished product meets all the design requirements, and functions
properly and safely as an integrated system."29 7 The Board of Re-
gents' original position on the issue engendered a significant debate in
New York and attracted considerable attention in the industry. In
part, that debate called into question the legitimacy of specialty de-
sign-build itself.298
The court upheld the Board of Regents' delegation rule, primarily
based on established case law validating design-build contracting
practices against public policy and safety attacks. 29 9 The court con-
cluded that a design professional retained through an unlicensed in-
293. 670 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
294. Id. at 699-700.
295. Id. at 698 (quoting from the petitioners' reply memorandum of law).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 699 (quoting from a memorandum issued by the Deputy Commissioner for
the Professions, State Education Department).
298. See Milton F. Lunch, Delegation of Design Issue Rekindled, BUILDING DESIGN &
CONSTRUCTION, Jan. 1992, at 27; Milton F. Lunch, Delegation of Design Remains
a Contentious Issue, BUILDING DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Nov. 1996, at 25; Edito-
rial, supra note 253, at 110.
299. Gen. Bldg. Contractors of N.Y. State, Inc., 670 N.Y.S.2d 697, 700-01 (citing Char-
lebois v. J. M. Weller Assocs, Inc., 531 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y. 1988)).
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termediary as the delegatee of a principle design professional, just like
a design professional engaged by a design-build contractor, has an ob-
ligation to act independently of unlicensed oversight in the exercise of
professional judgment. It is interesting that the court found secon-
dary, although not definitive, support for its conclusion in the fact that
a major contractor's association had endorsed the 1997 General Condi-
tions that include the ALA Allocation Clause.30 0
E. The New Design-Build World
The growing popularity and importance of specialty design-build is
defining a new design-build world. This is not the now familiar de-
sign-build world of single point responsibility, but a world in which
design-build practices dominate some critical aspects of a project even
while the primary responsibility for design and construction remain
divided along traditional lines between the project design team and
the construction team. The concluding Part of this Article discusses
how to bring legal order to this new design-build world.
V. A NEW PERSPECTIVE FOR THE NEW
DESIGN-BUILD WORLD
A. Rethinking Responsibility for Specialty Design
From an industry perspective, specialty design-build is an efficient
option that makes only subtle changes to the working relationships
involved in a traditional design-bid-build project. The specialty de-
sign-build practice maintains the fundamental design principle of the
traditional system, which is that the owner's design team provides
project-wide design and coordinated project administration. 30 When
viewed from a legal perspective, however, specialty design-build rep-
resents a revolutionary change because it fundamentally alters tradi-
tional legal relationships. If the parties choose specialty design-build
without thoroughly reevaluating conventional contracting practices,
unanticipated legal consequences may result. The effect may be exag-
gerated in many projects because the participants, without deliberat-
ing over legal distinctions, may use customary industry contract
language.302 Lawyers, courts, arbitrators, regulatory agencies, and
legislatures may all need to adjust their perspectives to recognize the
new reality of specialty design-build.
While some of the issues this new reality presents should primarily
interest lawyers negotiating contracts on behalf of specific partici-
pants, others raise important policy considerations for legislatures,
300. Id. at 700.
301. See SWEET, supra note 6, § 17.03(A) (noting that the design function is separate
and independent of the construction function).
302. Stipanowich, supra note 6, at 522-28.
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courts, and regulatory agencies. It is these policy considerations that
are of greatest interest for the purposes of this Article. This conclud-
ing Part discusses some of the issues having policy implications that
are beginning to percolate through the layers of contractual relations
affected by specialty design-build.
Although specialty design-build (and other shared design prac-
tices) may be employed in a wide variety of circumstances, for present
purposes it will be helpful to consider the key policy issues in the con-
text of a common pattern for commercial projects that use specialty
design-build. In this pattern the owner retains a project architect
who prepares plans that call for the prime contractor to arrange for
the specialty design through a trade subcontractor who may have in-
house design capabilities or who may in turn secure the specialty de-
sign from another (often an engineering consultant, but sometimes a
manufacturer, fabricator, or supplier). This method, therefore, injects
a design-build subcontract into the traditional design-bid-build pro-
ject delivery system. The AIA Allocation Clause discussed at length
earlier in this Article contemplates this form of specialty
design-build.303
The defining attribute of the design-build subcontract approach is
that the participants allocate the responsibility for an important de-
sign activity to a specialty designer who is part of the construction
team rather than part of the owner's design team. Under this ar-
rangement, the project follows the traditional design-bid-build sys-
tem except for the design-build subcontract covering the specialty
work. Because the owner's project architect retains overall dominion
over the project design concept, the design documents prepared by the
owner's project architect and its team of consultants include architec-
tural drawings that provide the design concept for the entire project,
including the specialty work. The bidding documents issued by the
owner's design team, however, provide for the prime contractor to ar-
range for the final, detailed design for the discrete portion of the pro-
ject that constitutes the specialty work. Under this structure, the
project architect and its consultants will review the specialty design,
but solely for the purpose of confirming that it is consistent with their
design intent.
Facilitated by this construct, this Part draws on the principles re-
viewed in Parts III and IV to propose a new perspective on risk alloca-
tion for projects that use specialty design-build. The discussion
focuses on selected issues that highlight why specialty design-build
heralds a new design-build era for legislative, regulatory, and judicial
purposes.
303. See supra section LV.B.
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B. Licensing and Regulatory Concerns
1. Adapting Existing Public Safety and Professional Conduct
Regulations
The public has a strong interest in assuring that a qualified and
licensed design professional provides, and accepts responsibility for,
the design of any specialty work that may affect worker or public
safety. Existing building codes, licensing statutes, and regulations
governing the design professions should serve as a first line of defense
for these purposes. In many jurisdictions, existing laws and regula-
tions may protect adequately against unprofessional conduct, such as
might appear if a licensed design professional approves critical spe-
cialty design submittals for a project without reviewing them care-
fully.304 A typical licensing and regulatory scheme also requires that
construction plans must be signed and sealed by an appropriately li-
censed design professional. The question is whether states should re-
fine their existing licensing and professional conduct codes in light of
contemporary specialty design practices.
At a minimum, policy considerations counsel state legislatures and
licensing agencies to assure that qualified, licensed design profession-
als remain accountable for important specialty design decisions and
documents throughout the process that produces the final, detailed
design. Simple modifications to existing laws and regulations may
prove adequate for this purpose. Properly crafted professional con-
duct regulations, for example, could prohibit the project architect from
excluding a specialty design service from the architectural services
contract if the effect of the exclusion would be to allow an unlicensed
specialty trade to perform that design service. Moreover, if a project
requires specialty design, then the project architect should have a
duty under the regulatory regime to provide sufficient design criteria
and other design information to direct the specialty firm to engage a
properly licensed design professional for specialty design services.
Licensing and regulatory changes may also be necessary to clarify
the boundaries between professional design activities and limited de-
sign functions that unlicensed trade personnel may properly perform.
There may be situations in which a proposed division of design respon-
sibility is itself unsound under professional standards. This might be
so if the structural integrity of the project as a whole depends on the
integrity of the specialty component and the process proposed by the
owner's design team fails to provide for the appropriate coordination
and integration of separate designs. At a more activist level, some
legislatures or regulatory agencies may wish to consider whether reg-
304. This, in effect, is the nature of the professional misconduct that was at issue in
Duncan v. Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers & Land Survey-
ors, 744 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
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ulated design professionals, builders, and specialty trades should be
under any obligation to disclose to owners the extent to which profes-
sional liability insurance covers project design services.
Building code administrators and licensing agencies may not be in
a position to monitor requirements of this nature proactively, but they
can impose appropriate procedures and safeguards through updated
regulations that define unprofessional conduct. Doing so will not only
encourage compliance by licensees, but it will also provide a sufficient
basis for enforcement actions and the assessment of liability when de-
sign professionals fail to adhere to the specified standards and
procedures.
Perhaps state legislatures and regulatory agencies should estab-
lish special protections for residential construction to guard against
practices by which licensed design professionals shun responsibility
for life and safety matters. Legislatures concerned about this risk
should first determine whether specialty design practices for residen-
tial construction circumvent professional responsibilities to consum-
ers. The implied warranty that most jurisdictions impose on
residential builders and sellers of new construction30 5 may serve to
protect consumers adequately. That may not be the case, however,
when specialty design-build practices threaten a public interest in
sound construction that goes beyond the interests of an individual
home buyer. Perhaps consumer protection goals at least warrant leg-
islation requiring licensed professionals to prepare or approve certain
critical design documents for residential projects.
If special consumer protections are warranted, building codes may
provide the most direct avenue for these protections because the codes
and the building permit processes they regulate can function to re-
quire construction plans to be signed and sealed by properly licensed
design professionals who assume responsibility for critical safety as-
pects of the project. Building codes and building permit processes,
however, are local and may not provide the uniform protection that
state legislatures may prefer. For that reason, states may choose to
prescribe a role for an architect or engineer "of record" for the struc-
tural, electrical, or other aspects of residential projects that involve
risk of personal injury or that otherwise threaten unsafe or inade-
quate construction. 3 06 Special regulation of residential projects may
not be feasible or likely, however, because these projects rarely involve
novel or complex designs or unusual risks, and because industry
305. See generally 3 BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 2, § 9:72.
306. For a discussion of special regulatory concerns and objectives appropriate to
transactions involving residential construction, see Stipanowich, supra note 6, at
502-05; Turner, supra note 160.
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groups will lobby state legislatures to avoid imposing costly regula-
tions on residential construction. 30 7
Even if additional, direct regulation of residential design practices
are not warranted, legislatures might consider requiring residential
builders to disclose whether or not all designers involved in the project
have a minimum level of professional liability insurance and whether
or not there is an insured, licensed professional of record who will ac-
cept responsibility for the entire design. While all of these special con-
cerns relating to residential construction may be legitimate, they are
unlikely to receive serious consideration in those states that exclude
residential design even from the professional licensing laws. 308
Legislatures may also consider imposing special protections for
public projects to assure the use of sound design practices. 30 9 In this
regard, the primary question is whether public agencies, unaided by
special legislative or regulatory mandates, can reliably determine for
themselves the manner in which design responsibility may be divided
among the project architect or project engineer (who will sometimes be
a public official or an employee of the agency) and specialty
designers. 3 10
2. Direct Regulation of Specialty Design-Build
One could argue for a regulatory approach that requires a single
design professional serving as the licensed designer of record accept
ultimate responsibility for all design aspects of the project or for
predefined portions of the project. Aside from the New York and Flor-
ida regulations already mentioned, 3 1 1 however, there seems to be lit-
tle support for that approach in existing state licensing laws.312 A
more sensible and workable approach might seek to regulate the divi-
307. Some state licensing schemes exclude residential construction, at least to some
extent, from requirements that design services may only be performed by li-
censed design professionals. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6737.1 (West
2002); Ga. State Bd. of Architects v. Arnold, 292 S.E.2d 830 (Ga. 1982).
308. See supra notes 306-07.
309. For example, California imposes special restrictions on the division of design re-
sponsibilities for public school construction. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 21,
§ 16 (2004). Cf. Roberts & Smith, supra note 9.
310. See Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Delegation of Design Responsibility to Con-
struction Contractors: What Are the Risks?, NASH & CIBINIc REP., Nov. 1993, at 65
(criticizing the growing practice of shifting significant design responsibility to
contractors in public construction projects).
311. See supra subsection IV.D.2.
312. Cf STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO ARCHITECT, ENGINEER, AND CONTRACTOR LIcENS-
ING, supra note 263 (containing summaries of state engineering licensing require-
ments that generally reflect requirement that engineering services for individual
engineering specialties, such as structural design, be undertaken only by those
holding the appropriate professional licenses).
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sion of design responsibility only to the extent required by considera-
tions of safety or professionalism.
New regulations that merely restrict improper delegation of design
functions will have little effect on specialty design-build practices. 3 13
If regulation governs only design delegation, then owners and design
professionals who wish to divide design responsibility for a project be-
tween the owner's project A/E and one or more specialty trades will do
so without delegating. They will simply redefine the scope of the pro-
ject A/E's contractual responsibilities to exclude rather than to dele-
gate the specialty design.
With that observation in mind, the New York regulatory reaction
to specialty design-build seems misdirected, at least if read literally.
It appears to focus exclusively on licensed design professionals who
delegate their professional responsibilities. 3 14 As long as the project
A/E and the project A/B's consultants have no contractual duty to de-
sign a particular component, any regulation similar to the New York
delegation provision might be rendered impotent by the simple and
logical device of imposing contractual responsibility for a specialty
component in the first place solely on a specialty designer or specialty
trade firm. While it is not always objectionable for the project A/E to
exclude responsibility for a specialty design, the New York approach
fails to address those situations in which the unregulated exclusion of
the project A/E from the specialty design may threaten public safety or
the integrity of the professional licensing requirements.
The Florida regulations, on the other hand, may represent a some-
what more valid approach because they recognize that the contract
documents may properly allocate to distinct engineers of record re-
sponsibility for different categories of design, such as structural,
mechanical, and electrical engineering, provided that a qualified engi-
neer of record takes responsibility for each discrete category of design.
The Florida regulations impose controls over a shared design scheme
in the first instance by recognizing that strong public policy considera-
tions dictate that all significant design services for a construction pro-
ject should be furnished by, or come under the direct control and
supervision of, a properly licensed design professional who accepts re-
sponsibility for that distinct component of the project design. At the
same time, the regulations comport with industry trends by recogniz-
313. Of course, licensing and regulatory agencies may be aware of instances in which
design professionals inappropriately delegate duties they have assumed, but
those instances have no logical connection to specialty design-build practices,
which do not necessarily involve a design professional delegating any of his or her
duties to others.
314. To the extent the New York regulation merely attempts to prohibit unprofes-
sional practices by which a design professional undertakes a design duty and
then delegates that duty without exercising the requisite level of care, it is sound
but not directly relevant to the concerns of this Article.
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ing that it is not essential to require or assume that a single design
professional must have responsibility for all aspects of the project de-
sign. The Florida regulations also seem implicitly to recognize an im-
portant corollary to these principles by anticipating that sound
practices will normally dictate that a designated engineer of record
should retain overall responsibility for certain predefined categories of
engineering, such as the structural, mechanical, or electrical aspects
of a project.3 15
The Florida regulatory scheme, however, is incomplete. It does no
more than to embody an implicit assumption that all engineering as-
pects of a project will probably fall within the scope of services pro-
vided by an appropriate engineer of record for a recognized category of
engineer work. It does nothing to address some important threshold
issues. For example, must engineering responsibilities for a project be
divided solely among the pre-defined engineering categories recog-
nized by the regulations, which include the structural, mechanical,
and electrical engineering disciplines? Additionally, the regulations
do not address the role that a project architect plays in the common
situation in which the architect retains engineering consultants in
each of those disciplines. Moreover, the Florida scheme, in a manner
similar to the New York one, consistently focuses on the delegation of
specific design functions and ignores shared design practices that do
not involve delegation. Thus the Florida regulations provide, at best,
ambiguous and incomplete guidance on the important question
whether the owner's "prime professional engineer" and the "engineer
of record" for each pre-defined engineering discipline remain free to
exclude entirely from their scopes of services certain specialized, but
nonetheless critical, design functions.316
The Florida regulations evince a sound initial approach to the
problem of specialty design-build, but they fail to address the problem
comprehensively. In time, further experience with specialty de-
sign-build and other forms of shared design responsibility may
demonstrate the need for more comprehensive regulation.
315. But cf MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 112, § 81R(a) (1996) (expressly permiting unlicensed
design by specialty trades); see also supra subsection IV.D.1.
316. The definitions of these terms may imply the assumption that the owner will
engage a project engineer who in turn will retain consulting engineers for spe-
cialty services. See supra text accompanying notes 273-84. According to Florida
Engineers Management Corp. v. Newton, No. 02-2536PL, 2002 WL 31872627
(Fla. Div. Adm. Hrg. Dec. 20, 2002), an engineer of record does not violate the
regulation by providing performance specifications directing that a specialty con-
tractor, rather than the engineer, select and retain a specialty engineer who then
submits the design to the engineer of record. Thus, the order approves a specialty
design-build arrangement, but it does not suggest that the prime engineer may
thereby avoid oversight responsibility for the specialty design.
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C. Contract Remedies-Sanctity of Contract and Third-
Party Beneficiary Analysis
1. An Informed Approach to Contract Interpretation
Major, sophisticated parties can negotiate contracts that serve
their objectives and that facilitate commercially reasonable allocation
of risk and responsibility. The same is not true for those who are less
sophisticated or for those who have relatively little bargaining lever-
age. In practice, these participants often rely heavily on industry form
contracts and on the good faith of their contractual counterparties.
Given the highly competitive nature of the construction industry and
the conflicting risk management interests of the parties, it is not sur-
prising that contracting practices tend to preserve and strengthen the
commercially fittest. Even for those who enjoy the benefits of experi-
ence, sophistication and bargaining position, new contracting patterns
usually develop at an evolutionary pace.
The first problem, then, for a contract-based resolution is not that
the marketplace will fail to produce comprehensive and workable con-
tracting structures for specialty design-build practices. Rather, it is
that the process will take considerable time, during which all partici-
pants will bear the risks of uncertainty and economic inefficiency.
Participants in the construction industry will require time to absorb
and refine the unique characteristics of specialty design-build
through project by project trial and error. Owners, design profession-
als, prime contractors, trade subcontractors, and specialty designers
will undoubtedly flounder in a mire of unanticipated consequences.
Many contracting parties will merely hope that standard industry
contracts will somehow prove adequate to deal with the unique risks
of shared design responsibility. The second, and more pernicious,
problem is that the eventual industry solutions will probably not allo-
cate those risks in the most efficient or socially beneficial manner, but
will unduly favor major industry players.
Consider the inadequacy of current contracting practices in the in-
dustry to address specialty design issues. Under a traditional de-
sign-bid-build system, the project owner has no contract with a
design-build subcontractor or its design consultants. Moreover, under
contemporary practices, an owner's contract with a project architect
probably excludes design of the specialty work.3 17 The owner's princi-
pal contract remedies must derive from the agreement with the prime
317. Failure of the project architect or its engineering consultant to perform relevant
contract obligations might lead to a remedy arising out of the contract between
the owner and the project architect, assuming proof of causation, but the owner
would almost certainly resort primarily to a negligence theory rather than a con-
tract one as the primary basis for any claims against members of the owner's
design team. See supra section III.B.
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contractor, who arranges for the specialty design and construction
under a subcontract with the design-build subcontractor. If the
owner-contractor agreement includes the customary warranty of the
quality of all work encompassed by the agreement, the prime contrac-
tor may have broad contractual liability based on that warranty for
any design defects or errors.3 1 8
Notice the resulting anomaly that the customary arrangements
may produce among the owner, the prime contractor, the design-build
subcontractor, and the specialty designer. Assuming that the agree-
ment between the design-build subcontractor and its specialty de-
signer follows customs in the industry, the specialty designer bears
the sole professional responsibility for the specialty design activity but
does not warrant that its design will be free from defects. 31 9 The spe-
cialty designer is only liable for damages suffered by its direct client
(the design-build subcontractor), and then only if the specialty design
services fall short of the professional standard of care. By contrast,
the prime contractor may have neither the expertise nor the ability to
control the design, and may be serving primarily as a conduit through
which the owner and the project architect allocate design responsibil-
ity for the specialty work. In some cases the subcontractor may be in
the same situation. Yet the customary contract practices call for the
prime contractor and each subcontractor to warrant that its entire
scope of work will be free from defects.32o Moreover, if a court views
the prime contractor and the subcontractor as design-builders for the
specialty work, they may be liable under an implied warranty that the
design is fit for the intended purpose. 32 1
The AIA Allocation Clause is but an initial industry attempt to ad-
dress specialty design-build, and it misses the mark in many impor-
tant respects. In the first place, as with many AIA contract
provisions, the AIA Allocation Clause favors project architects and
fails to address adequately the legitimate concerns of those who have
the least input into the AIA drafting process, especially owners and
318. See, e.g., Hercules Constr. Co. v. C. J. Moritz Co., 655 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Wyrozynski v. Nichols, 752 S.W.2d
433, 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (procedural point only).
319. See Surf Realty Corp. v. Standing, 78 S.E.2d 901, 907 (Va. 1953).
320. A lawyer representing the prime contractor might negotiate terms that limit or
disclaim design liability. The prime contractor is not serving in this situation as
a design-build contractor, presumably has no expertise in the specialty design,
and is not well positioned to control the design risks. The prime contractor is
merely better positioned than any of the other participants to arrange for the
specialty design because of its working relationship with the trades and its expe-
rience and administrative capability and contractual authority to coordinate the
work and schedules of the different trades. One logical solution would be for the
owner to negotiate for third-party beneficiary status under the contract for the
specialty design services.
321. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
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subcontractors. At a more substantive level, the AIA Allocation
Clause, while perhaps adequate in the more innocuous (and perhaps
most common) instances of specialty design-build, fails to anticipate
and resolve the more difficult and important responsibility and liabil-
ity problems. The earlier discussion of the AIA Allocation Clause
noted several of the issues involved.32 2 Chief among these are the va-
garies of the provisions for the owner and the project architect to
"specify all performance and design criteria" for the specialty design
and for the architect to "review, approve or take other appropriate ac-
tion on submittals only for the limited purpose of checking for con-
formance with information given and the design concept expressed in
the Contact Documents." One might question how often the parties'
deference to these critical, vague phrases in a form document reflects
a meaningful meeting of the minds.
As unique issues arise in specialty design-build cases, industry
contract language will often prove inadequate. Frequently, this will
be because the contracting parties did not, and probably could not,
anticipate all issues at the time of contract. Under such circum-
stances, should courts, mediators, and arbitrators rely strictly on
terms of the written contracts? Should they presume, even in the face
of compelling indications to the contrary, that the written agreements
fully express the parties' economic assumptions and collective under-
standings relevant to the complex liability issues that may result from
particular situations? In many cases, courts will appropriately feel
constrained by sanctity of contract presumptions. By contrast,
mediators and arbitrators may more openly recognize and reflect in
their deliberations the tentative and incomplete nature of standard-
ized documents or sparse contract provisions concerning specialty de-
sign-build practices. Even courts should be alert to the possibility
that the contracting parties may not clearly or completely define the
interdependent relationships fostered by specialty design-build prac-
tices. This may be especially important when the owner is a consumer
or if it is clear that any party was unsophisticated and had little alter-
native other than to rely on form documents or terms otherwise dic-
tated by stronger parties whose motives may have been to deflect risk
allocation issues rather than to resolve them.3 2 3
For example, at times it may be appropriate to interpret a contract
involving specialty design-build with some appreciation for the inter-
related roles of multiple participants who enter into distinct contracts
322. See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
323. See St. Paul Cos. v. Constr. Mgmt. Co., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1097 (D. Mont. 2000)
(finding architects affiliated with residential builder responsible for errors in
electrical wiring by trade contractor).
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concerning related aspects of the project. 3 24 This may mean that a
mediator, arbitrator, or court should be open to the argument that a
contract provision relating to shared design responsibilities is ambigu-
ous or fails to state the complete understanding of the parties because
it does not reflect the complex, multi-party interdependence of the
specialty design process actually employed by the participants in the
particular case.3 25 As a result, it may sometimes be appropriate to
consider parol evidence to establish what the parties intended as the
precise scope of a given participant's responsibility for specialty work.
It may also be important to recognize that shared design, by its na-
ture, involves more than one party in the specialty design process.
Even with this open-minded approach to contract interpretation, legit-
imate contract-based solutions may often prove evasive, at least until
the marketplace has had time to nurture industry refinements to con-
tractual risk allocation practices. 3 26
2. The Third-Party Beneficiary Problem
Those who suffer damages due to defective specialty design may
seek third-party beneficiary remedies. Contracts that allocate the
risks of shared design services ambiguously or incompletely may fre-
quently invite, yet rarely support, those arguments. It is one thing to
resolve contractual ambiguities or fill in contractual gaps by reference
to the realities of the new design-build world, but it is a far more
questionable matter to imply that a party to a construction or design
324. It may be appropriate to recognize one peculiar reality of the new design-build
world when a prime contractor and specialty trade firm merely arrange for design
services as an accommodation. Without relieving any party from the unambigu-
ous terms of the controlling contracts, mediators, arbitrators, and courts could
properly consider whether the parties intended that a customary warranty or in-
demnity provision would impose obligations on a party only with respect to con-
struction work (materials and work quality) or to design services as well. If a
prime contractor or a subcontractor has no direct design responsibility and no
design capability, there may be other factors present to indicate an accommoda-
tion role only.
325. This rational is consistent with the Uniform Commercial Code's version of the
parole evidence rule, see U.C.C. § 2-202 (2003), however contracts for construc-
tion and design services generally are not governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code. Mid-State Elec., Inc. v. H.L. Libby Corp., 787 F. Supp. 494, 498-99 (W.D.
Pa. 1992); Palmer v. Espey Huston & Assocs., 84 S.W.3d 345, 355-56 (Tex. App.
2002). Even though section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code may not be
controlling, its rational may be useful by analogy. See generally 1 BRUNER &
O'CONNOR, supra note 2, § 3:12.
326. Especially in complex projects, the owner and its design team should consider
entering into a project-wide design participation agreement with all major par-
ticipants. The project design participation agreement could clarify matters of im-
portance to many parties, such as to whom each signing participant owes specific
duties, which parties must provide insurance for the protection of other partici-
pants, and any limits on liability, warranty, and indemnity obligations.
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contract intended to benefit another. An owner or other participant
who seeks the protection of a design services contract made by others
should negotiate with those parties for that protection before, not af-
ter, the damage is done.
In many situations, the owner may present an appealing argument
for implying a third-party beneficiary term into the contract between
the design-build subcontractor and the specialty designer. After all,
the design-build subcontractor contracts for the specialty services in
order to complete the specialty work for the owner's ultimate benefit.
The argument has appeal, especially in the common situation in
which all parties openly acknowledge that the objective for the spe-
cialty design services is to satisfy design criteria established for the
owner's benefit by the project architect. That objective will often be
manifested both under the terms of the contract between the prime
contractor and the design-build subcontractor and under the terms of
the contract between the design-build subcontractor and the specialty
designer.
In appropriate cases, many other participants in the design and
construction process also might logically argue for third-party benefi-
ciary status under the contract between the design-build subcontrac-
tor and the specialty engineer on essentially the same basis that the
owner could. For example, if the specialty work includes structural
components to be integrated with the project as a whole, the subcon-
tractor and its design consultant must have recognized that all of the
participants would rely on the structural integrity of the specialty de-
sign and, at least in some sense, the subcontractor and its consultant
must have intended that the design should benefit all participants.
Under established contract law principles, however, a court ordina-
rily will not recognize third-party beneficiary status in favor of an inci-
dental beneficiary, because it is the real (even if implied) intent of the
contracting parties, and not revisionist logic, that should inform
proper contract interpretation. 3 27 Unique facts in an appropriate case
might legitimately persuade a court to confer third-party beneficiary
status on an owner or even in favor of another participant in the con-
struction process who has no direct contract remedies. For the most
part, however, there is little to commend imposing completely fictional
intent on contracting parties. At least in common commercial situa-
tions, the courts should continue to base contract rights and remedies
on actual agreements. The more legitimate question is whether a
court should impose a non-contractual duty on the specialty engineer
for the protection of the owner or another third party. As is often the
327. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Iowa S. Utils. Co., 355 F. Supp. 376 (S.D. Iowa
1973); SWEET, supra note 6, § 14.08B; see also supra notes 120-25 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 84:162
SPECIALTY DESIGNS
case with other claims arising from design defects, relationships con-
ceived in contract will inevitably give birth to claims premised in tort.
3. The Transition to Tort Theory Redux
In dealing with tort claims arising out of specialty design errors,
the fundamental question the courts must resolve is whether the spe-
cialty designer owes a duty of professional care to those other than the
designer's client. Courts comfortably identify a duty of professional
care in favor of the client because the design professional's contractual
undertaking establishes a special relationship in which the client's
welfare is dependent on the professional's special training, experience,
and judgment.328 The cases sometimes explain that the duty is sepa-
rate from the contract between the client and the design professional,
even though it may be based on the contractual relationship. 32 9 Cases
that imply a duty of professional care into the contractual relationship
between the client and the design professional recognize that, by un-
dertaking responsibility toward a client to perform professional design
services, a design professional establishes a special relationship with
the client that goes beyond the contractual relationship and the ex-
plicit terms of the contract.3 30
Although an analysis that injects a tort duty into a contractual re-
lationship seems counterintuitive, there are strong justifications for
the leap from a contract obligation voluntarily assumed to a broader
tort duty to the client. The circumstances of building construction in-
variably involve a foreseeable risk of serious loss to the client. The
client does not have the special training, knowledge, and experience
required to protect against that risk. The design professional assumes
responsibility for activities critical to the management of some of the
risks inherent in the construction process.
To limit the duty analysis to the relationship between client and
design professional, however, is to ignore the principle that tort law
provides a remedy for breach of duty imposed by public policy consid-
erations and not for breach of contractual obligations.331 At least in
cases of personal injury or property damage, a tort analysis should
inquire whether a design professional furnishing services directly or
indirectly through the owner's prime contractor should owe a profes-
sional duty to avoid causing foreseeable harm to non-clients who will
be directly affected by the design services. Design professionals, like
medical doctors and other professionals, may assume responsibility
328. See supra section III.B.
329. See, e.g., Minn. Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ligna Mach., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892 (D.
Minn. 1998); Clark-Fitzpatrick v. Long Island R.R., 516 N.E.2d 190 (N.Y. 1987).
330. See, e.g., Minn. Forest Prods. Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 892.
331. See Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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for the due performance of their services simply by undertaking to
perform those services. 33 2
If a special relationship in favor of a client may give rise to a pro-
fessional duty of care that is, as the cases say, independent from the
designer-client contract, then it should also be possible for a similar
relationship to exist where there is no applicable contract. Multiple
participants in a construction project frequently enter into a series of
arrangements that in fact create special relationships in which non-
clients logically must depend on the special training, knowledge, and
experience of a design professional. When that occurs, why should it
matter whether or not those participants injured by the design profes-
sional's failure to exercise the appropriate level of care have a contrac-
tual relationship with the professional? Cannot the special
relationship necessary for a professional duty of care arise from the
voluntary, interdependent arrangements that the participants estab-
lish in a typical construction project?
D. The Reach of Tort Law
1. The Owner's Remedies for Specialty Design Defects
The project is the owner's project, and any design professional who
provides services for the project is in a relationship with the owner
that is, at least in the contemplation and reasonable expectations of
the participants, no less a professional relationship than it would be if
the owner contracted for the design services directly. In this sense,
there is little to distinguish the relationship created when an owner
retains a design professional and the relationships created when a
member of the construction team retains a design professional to pro-
vide the same service. In either case, the express purpose of the ar-
rangement is to secure for the owner's objectives and benefit
professional services essential to the safe, sound, and successful com-
pletion of the owner's project. An engineer who designs a fire safety
system under a contract with a system installer retained by the prime
contractor does not design the system primarily to protect the installa-
tion subcontractor or the prime contractor from the risk of fire. In this
important sense, nearly all critical components of a project, whether
designed pursuant to a contract with the owner or pursuant to a con-
tract with another participant in the construction process, are for the
owner. For these reasons, tort law should impose on the specialty de-
signer a duty of professional care toward the owner based on the rea-
332. Cf. Peeler v. DeWitt, 3 S.W.3d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that, although
architect volunteered to inspect courthouse and advise governing body with re-
spect to specific proposed renovations, he was not liable to plaintiff injured when
courthouse steps collapsed because the architect's voluntary undertaking did not
extend to structural safety matters).
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sonable expectations established by the contractual arrangements by
which the participants collectively allocate actual responsibility and
upon which they all reasonably rely.3 3 3
The owner might also assert tort liability against the specialty en-
gineer based on a negligent misrepresentation. Negligent misrepre-
sentation may be a viable theory, for example, if the specialty engineer
issues a report knowing that the owner (or others) will reasonably rely
on it. 33 4 There is, however, nothing inherent in the specialty de-
sign-build process to suggest negligent misrepresentation claims in
most situations.
In addition to claims against the specialty engineer, in some cases
the owner may have a claim against the project architect or the archi-
tect's engineering consultant for specialty design defects.335 The
owner may establish a professional negligence claim against the pro-
ject architect by proving the project architect's professional negligence
in performing services under the architect's contract that relate to the
specialty work. Several factual possibilities might emerge.
The owner might be able to show that the project architect or the
architect's engineering consultant negligently approved the specialty
engineer or negligently failed to review or question the qualifications
of the specialty engineer. The contract for the project architect's ser-
vices is likely to leave considerable doubt about the role of the archi-
tect and its consultants in selecting or approving design professionals
retained by a design-build subcontractor. 33 6 In an appropriate cir-
333. See Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 677 P.2d 1292 (Ariz. 1984)
(holding that a contractor whose bid was based on architect's plans may recover
in tort from an architect for foreseeable damages attributable to negligent prepa-
ration of plans). The result in Commercial Distribution Center, Inc. v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) also supports this conclusion, but
the court's opinion does not articulate a clear basis for imposing on the subcon-
tractors involved a professional duty of care in favor of the owner. The case is
discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this Article. See supra text accompanying
notes 106-07, 247-51. Adopting the approach suggested by Caldwell and Don-
nelly Construction Co., some courts would recognize a duty of care in favor of the
owner primarily because damage to the owner is foreseeable under the
circumstances.
334. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
335. The owner's claim to recover in tort from the project architect's engineering con-
sultant, who may have played a more direct role than the architect in connection
with the specialty design, would face the same duty-based defenses available to
the specialty engineer. The architect is unlikely, in a normal situation, to be vi-
cariously liable for the engineering consultant's negligence. See supra subsection
III.C.4.
336. For example, under clause 2.6.4.3 of the American Institute of Architects' AIA
Document B141TM-1997, Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Ar-
chitect with Standard Form of Architect's Services, if the contract documents re-
quire the contractor to arrange for professional design services, the architect is
'entitled to rely upon the adequacy, accuracy and completeness" of those services.
AIA ARCHITECT'S SERVICES, supra note 71.
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cumstance, however, the owner might successfully argue that either
the contract language or the surrounding circumstances imply a role.
For example, if the plans provided by the owner's architect and its
engineering consultants provide that a subcontractor must furnish
critical structural design details, a court might conclude that the pro-
ject architect's professional responsibility includes, by necessary im-
plication, at least the obligation to confirm that the subcontractor
retains a qualified structural engineer.
The project architect and its engineering consultant might also in-
cur liability if they fail to convey adequately to the design-build sub-
contractor the design concept or inadequately established the design
criteria for the subcontractor to meet. It is difficult to assess in the
abstract how to address claims of this nature because it is not clear
how a court should interpret a contractual requirement that the pro-
ject architect must provide the design concept and the design criteria.
Presumably, even though the project architect's design services agree-
ment completely excludes the specialty design, the project architect
and its engineering consultant still may need to specify certain critical
details. For example, if the specialty work involves structural compo-
nents, the owner's design team may be responsible to provide such
critical design details as the load bearing requirements of connections
or the materials to be used. In some cases, the design professionals on
the owner's design team might be subject to liability for failing to spec-
ify that the specialty engineering submittals must meet certain indus-
try standards or must include certain supporting documentation or
calculations.
The process involved in approving or otherwise permitting the spe-
cialty design to become final may provide the most fertile ground for a
claim against either the project architect or its engineering consult-
ant. No matter how the contract documents describe the actions of the
owner's design team in relation to the specialty work, one or more
members of the team will probably have some responsibility with re-
spect to a significant number of submittals that require action on be-
half of the owner. Each of those responsibilities must be performed in
conformity with the professional standard of care. For example, the
architect might incur liability based on a limited obligation to review
the construction drawings for conformance with the requirements or
information the architect furnished or based on an obligation to coor-
dinate the specialty design documentation with the other design docu-
ments for the project. A claim of that nature might succeed, for
example, if the architect's plans show inadequate details to guide a
manufacturer in the manufacturing process or if the architect accepts
drawings submitted by the subcontractor that bear no professional
seal, or if a process or documents essential to proper coordination are
missing or inadequate.
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The owner might even be able to develop evidence that the project
architect breached the professional standard of care by leaving re-
sponsibility for the specialty design to a design-build subcontractor in
the first instance. This would probably require expert testimony that
under the circumstances it was not professionally prudent to divide
design responsibility in the manner contemplated by the project archi-
tect's plans. There must be circumstances in which a project architect
should not allow division of design responsibility or should do so only
with the added protection of a comprehensive review on the owner's
behalf by an independent engineer who is part of the owner's design
team. At a minimum, the project architect should be responsible in
most cases to establish a process that assures that appropriately li-
censed professionals provide or approve all critical design services and
that coordinates all design services for the project.
In some situations, a court might identify a non-delegable duty of
the project architect or one of the architect's engineering consultants.
Even if a court would recognize a non-delegable duty of a member of
the owner's design team for certain aspects of the project, one might
question whether that duty should extend to a specialty design that is
expressly excluded from the contract between the owner and the pro-
ject architect. In an appropriate case, a court might explicitly or im-
plicitly impose a non-delegable duty on the project architect or the
architect's engineering consultant as the design professional of record
for the project or on the basis of ordinances governing approval of de-
sign plans under the applicable building code. 33 7
The owner may also have claims against other participants. For
example, the owner might be able to show that the design-build sub-
contractor negligently selected an unqualified specialty engineer 33 8 or
that the prime contractor negligently approved the specialty engineer
or negligently failed to review or question the qualifications of the en-
gineer. The owner might also assert claims against the design-build
subcontractor and the prime contractor either based on some negli-
gence on their parts connected with the design error or based on a
warranty or vicarious liability theory. Some authorities might sup-
port a vicarious liability argument, but in many cases, a court would
337. In effect, this was the basis for the non-delegable duty recognized by the court in
Duncan v. Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers & Land Survey-
ors, 744 S.W.2d 524, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
338. But see John Grace & Co. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 475 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1984), affirming as modified 472 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (reversing
the portion of the Appellate Division's opinion that upheld a claim against an
engineer on the basis, inter alia, that the engineer negligently failed to inquire
into the qualifications of a manufacturer who specified inappropriate materials).
Query whether, if the negligent selection theory applies, the design-build subcon-
tractor should be held to an ordinary negligence or professional negligence
standard.
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probably conclude that, absent special circumstances, the specialty en-
gineer is an independent contractor and neither the design-build sub-
contractor nor any of the other participants controlled the engineer's
actions. 33 9
Even assuming that the specialty designer (or others involved in
the specialty design process) has potential tort liability to the owner,
whether the owner can recover damages may also depend in part on
the nature of the damages the owner suffers as a result of the spe-
cialty design defect. The owner might suffer damages that fall into
one of at least four distinct categories. One is personal injury that the
owner suffers as a result of a design error, which is possible only if the
owner is an individual rather than a business entity. Another is dam-
age to property other than the construction work, such as damage that
a failure of the specialty work might cause to the adjoining elements of
the project or to equipment the owner has on the construction site.
The third is damage to the construction work itself, as might occur if
the specialty design defect results in a structural collapse. The fourth
is damage that affects only the owner's economic interests, as would
be the case if discovery of the design error during construction causes
a costly delay in project completion. Depending on the jurisdiction in-
volved, a court might allow recovery for some or all of these dam-
ages. 340 While recovery for personal injury and damage to property
other than the project itself would be permitted under universal tort
concepts (assuming, of course, the existence of a duty to the owner),
recovery in the other two circumstances will depend on how the juris-
diction applies the economic loss rule.3 41
2. Professional Malpractice Claims by Those Other than the
Owner
The main distinction the courts may recognize between the protec-
tion to be afforded owners and the protection to be afforded other par-
ticipants concerns foreseeability of harm and the extent of the remote
design professional's duties under the design arrangements estab-
lished for the project. A design professional who provides professional
services in connection with a construction project should owe a duty of
professional care in favor of all participants in the construction pro-
cess who are within the foreseeable risk of harm that the design pro-
fessional's malpractice creates. In some cases, as with structural
engineering services, loss or damage to any participants in the process
is foreseeable, and all participants must depend on the design profes-
sional to perform with the requisite skill, experience and care. In
339. See Milicevich, supra note 109.
340. See supra subsection III.C.5.
341. See supra note 151.
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those cases, the courts should recognize a duty of professional care
toward all participants. In other situations, the responsibility that
the design professional assumes is too far removed from the interests
that tort law seeks to promote. For example, while the structural en-
gineer who designs a critical steel connection should owe a profes-
sional duty of care to all participants who must rely on the structural
design, the same duty probably should not apply to the project archi-
tect whose only undertaking is to review and advise the owner
whether the structural design submitted conforms to aesthetic
concepts.
For plaintiffs other than the owner, the clearest liability theory ap-
plies when a defective specialty design creates an extraordinary risk
of personal injury or death to workers during construction or to occu-
pants or members of the public following completion of the project.
Important distinctions may exist between personal injury claims of
construction workers and those of the public at large. Often, injury or
death to a construction worker arises out of risks peculiar to the con-
struction process itself, not because of the project design. In other cir-
cumstances, the nature of the risk to a construction worker during
construction may be substantially similar to the risk to the general
public after completion of construction. In the second situation, the
line of cases exonerating design professionals from liability for injury
to construction workers in the absence of a contractual duty on the
design professional for project safety or supervision of construction
should not apply. 34 2 For example, if the specialty work includes de-
sign of permanent structural components, the specialty designer
should have a professional duty of care toward all foreseeable victims
of an unsafe structural design. This should include both workers and
members of the public who may use the project. Established princi-
ples of tort law should provide a basis for a claim by any construction
worker, occupant, guest, or visitor injured as the result of an unsafe
design.
Injured workers or members of the public may also have negligence
claims against other participants in the design and construction pro-
cess if and to the extent that those participants share in the responsi-
bility for the specialty design. Whether other participants have that
responsibility should depend, in the first instance, on the terms of the
contractual arrangements to which those participants are parties.
There are some significant exceptions to this principle. One exception
might arise in connection with structural design if a participant as-
sumes responsibility for the structural integrity of certain connections
in some extra-contractual way. For example, an engineering consult-
ant who is under no contractual obligation to furnish load calculations
342. See supra subsection III.C.5.
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to any other participant, might do so anyway in conjunction with a
review of the structural plans submitted by the design-build subcon-
tractor in accordance with the requirements of the contract docu-
ments. Through that voluntary action, the engineering consultant
might assume a responsibility to follow prudent professional practice
in making those calculations.343 Another exception might arise if a
statute or code imposes on a participant other than the designer re-
tained by the subcontractor a duty concerning the structural design
and the court holds that duty to be non-delegable.344
Many participants in the design and construction process may also
have tort claims against the specialty engineer for economic loss. For
example, specialty design defects may create costly delays for subcon-
tractors whose progress depends on completion of the specialty work,
and a failure of a specialty component may require changes or addi-
tional work in several trades. The analysis of those claims should not
be materially different from that which applies to the owner's claims
against the engineer as already discussed. Like the owner, the other
participants might argue that the manifest purpose of allocating to
the specialty designer the responsibility for the specialty work was to
protect the interests of all of the participants, all of whom would nec-
essarily rely on the adequacy of the design and each of whom may be a
foreseeable victim of a serious design flaw.3 45 Like the owner, even if
these participants can establish a sufficient relationship with the neg-
ligent engineer, if their damages are purely economic they must then
confront the economic loss rule.346
3. The Economic Loss Rule Applied to Specialty Design Defects
The most difficult controversy that specialty design-build presents
for the courts involves not the existence of a duty, but the proper ap-
plication of the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule prevents
unlimited tort liability.3 47 In many jurisdictions, the economic loss
rule will normally prevent a plaintiff from recovering in tort for purely
economic loss. Other jurisdictions, however, have allowed recovery of
economic loss attributable to malpractice by design professionals.
343. Cf Peeler v. DeWitt, 3 S.W.3d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (involving an architect
who, after voluntarily advising public body concerning deterioration of county
courthouse, was sued by plaintiff who fell on courthouse steps).
344. For a discussion of non-delegable design duties, see supra subsection III.E.2. For
a discussion of regulations that govern the delegation of design duties, see supra
section IV.D.
345. Some courts may use an implied warranty theory to extend protection to any
participants in the construction process who must rely on the specialty design.
See E. Steel Constructors, Inc. v. City of Salem, 549 S.E.2d 266 (W.Va. 2001).
346. See subsection III.C.5.
347. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); Moor-
man Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443 (Ill. 1982).
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Still other jurisdictions adhere to the economic loss rule as a general
principle but recognize limited exceptions.
Specialty design-build presents a compelling case for an exception
to the economic loss rule when design malpractice by one participant
in the construction process causes loss to another participant. All of
the participants have associated themselves for a common purpose,
and many participants must rely on the design services provided by
specialty designers. In fact, if not by express intention, one function of
a design professional who provides critical design services for the pro-
ject may be to protect the economic interests of all of the participants.
The participants together share a community of interest that provides
a well-defined special relationship between the design professionals
and those who must rely on the design services. Economic loss is fore-
seeable and is not remote from the actions of the design professional.
This community of interest logically removes a construction project
from one of the main policy considerations that lead courts to adopt
the economic loss rule as a check against expanding theories of tort
liability. Allowing recovery to any participant in the construction pro-
cess for economic loss proximately caused by malpractice committed
by any design professional involved in the process does not present a
risk of unlimited or uncontrollable tort liability because the universe
of potential claimants is restricted to the finite and known class of
participants in the project.
One might argue that, on balance, it is a wiser policy for the courts
to leave the participants to the construction process to sort out their
respective commercial interests through consensual contractual ar-
rangements rather than to subject them to broad tort principles. Par-
ticipants do not find themselves exposed to the risk of design
malpractice by happenstance. Each participant makes a considered
economic decision to join in the community of interest that the project
represents. Theoretically, each has the opportunity to negotiate the
terms by which it will participate, including an appropriate fee for ac-
cepting the risks involved. Those with bargaining power can negotiate
indemnities, third-party beneficiary status, and other conditions to
protect their interests. Some participants can arrange for insurance
to cover some of the risks involved. Those without bargaining power
and little ability to insure against those risks that they cannot control
are arguably in no different position with respect to the potential con-
sequences of design defects than they are with respect to the other
considerable risks involved in the construction industry.348
While these arguments for a restrictive application of the economic
loss rule hold some appeal, they fail to recognize that for a significant
number of participants in the construction industry, the question is
348. See generally Siegfried & Sklar, supra note 203, at 323.
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not on what basis to participate, but whether or not to participate at
all. In this sense, the inexperienced owner who decides to proceed
with a project in which structural design will be furnished by a steel
fabricator selected by the prime contractor, as well as the small sub-
contractor who bids competitively for work that ultimately depends
upon designs furnished by a consultant to another subcontractor, are
not much different from the pedestrian who resolves to venture a step
into the crosswalk of a busy intersection. In such circumstances, tort
law may appropriately provide a remedy.
4. Contractual Limits on Liability in the New Design-Build
World
Once they begin to appreciate the liability issues involved, negoti-
ating parties will naturally look to contractual liability limits to help
manage the risks of specialty design. The courts will probably enforce
these contractual limits when clearly expressed in commercial con-
struction contracts to which the injured claimant is a party. The
courts may appropriately be less receptive to contractual limits in the
consumer context, when the claimant is not a party to the contract, or
when design professionals attempt to limit liability for breach of stat-
utory or non-delegable duties.3 49
VI. CONCLUSION
Current industry practices, as evidenced by the industry litera-
ture, industry form contracts and the few decided cases, reflect an in-
adequate grasp of the significantly altered issues that specialty
design-build presents. Construction law, as well as design and con-
struction contracting practices, must adapt to the new design-build
world in ways that achieve the efficient and sound allocation of shared
design liability risks. Legislatures and regulatory bodies should mod-
ify licensing, professional conduct, and other regulatory schemes to
recognize the inherent risks that specialty design-build may pose to
public safety and the integrity of the design professions. Courts,
mediators, and arbitrators should become attuned to new commercial
realties that may legitimately influence both contract interpretation
and tort policy, while at the same time they should give due respect to
the role of express contract negotiations between commercial parties
to work out new and economically efficient risk allocation conventions
in the already risk-riddled construction industry.
349. See supra section II.D.
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